John Mearsheimer

Well, in terms of China, I'm fully in favor of containing China.

Well, in terms of China, I'm fully in favor of containing China.

It's containment. I'm not interested in regime change. I'm not interested in trying to turn China into a democracy. Not going to happen, yeah. Not going to happen. We tried it, actually, and I thought it was foolish to even pursue a policy of engagement toward China. With regard to Russia, I don't think Russia is a serious threat to the United States.

It's containment. I'm not interested in regime change. I'm not interested in trying to turn China into a democracy. Not going to happen, yeah. Not going to happen. We tried it, actually, and I thought it was foolish to even pursue a policy of engagement toward China. With regard to Russia, I don't think Russia is a serious threat to the United States.

And indeed, I think the United States should have good relations with Putin. It's a remarkably foolish policy to push him into the arms of the Chinese. There are three great powers in the system, the United States, China, and Russia. China is a peer competitor to the United States. It's the most serious threat to the United States.

And indeed, I think the United States should have good relations with Putin. It's a remarkably foolish policy to push him into the arms of the Chinese. There are three great powers in the system, the United States, China, and Russia. China is a peer competitor to the United States. It's the most serious threat to the United States.

Russia is the weakest of those three great powers, and it's not a serious threat to us. If you are playing balance of power politics and you're interested as the United States in containing China, you want Russia on your side of the ledger. But what we have done in effect is we have pushed Russia into the arms of the Chinese. This is a remarkably foolish policy.

Russia is the weakest of those three great powers, and it's not a serious threat to us. If you are playing balance of power politics and you're interested as the United States in containing China, you want Russia on your side of the ledger. But what we have done in effect is we have pushed Russia into the arms of the Chinese. This is a remarkably foolish policy.

And furthermore, by getting bogged down in Ukraine and now bogged down in the Middle East, it's become very difficult for us to pivot to Asia to deal with China, which is the principal threat that we face.

And furthermore, by getting bogged down in Ukraine and now bogged down in the Middle East, it's become very difficult for us to pivot to Asia to deal with China, which is the principal threat that we face.

It's just not a threat. We're going to get to it.

It's just not a threat. We're going to get to it.

Do you want me to... Is it okay if I talk about this?

Do you want me to... Is it okay if I talk about this?

Okay. It is very important to emphasize, as David was saying, that Jeff and I agree on all sorts of issues, including Ukraine and Israel-Palestine, but we disagree fundamentally, as he just made clear, on China. And let me explain to you why I think that's the case, and then Jeff can tell you why he thinks I'm wrong.

Okay. It is very important to emphasize, as David was saying, that Jeff and I agree on all sorts of issues, including Ukraine and Israel-Palestine, but we disagree fundamentally, as he just made clear, on China. And let me explain to you why I think that's the case, and then Jeff can tell you why he thinks I'm wrong.

It has to do with security, whether you privilege security or survival, or whether you privilege prosperity. Economists, and I would imagine most of you in the audience, really care greatly about maximizing prosperity. For someone like me who's a realist, what I care about is maximizing the state's prospects of survival.

It has to do with security, whether you privilege security or survival, or whether you privilege prosperity. Economists, and I would imagine most of you in the audience, really care greatly about maximizing prosperity. For someone like me who's a realist, what I care about is maximizing the state's prospects of survival.

And when you live in an anarchic system, and in IR speak, that means there's no higher authority, there's no night watchman that could come down and rescue if you get into trouble. And this is the international system. There's no higher authority. In that anarchic world, the best way to survive is to be really powerful.

And when you live in an anarchic system, and in IR speak, that means there's no higher authority, there's no night watchman that could come down and rescue if you get into trouble. And this is the international system. There's no higher authority. In that anarchic world, the best way to survive is to be really powerful.

As we used to say when I was a kid on New York City playgrounds, you want to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block. And that's simply because it's the best way to survive. If you're really powerful, nobody fools around with you. The United States is a regional hegemon. It's the only regional hegemon on the planet. We dominate the Western Hemisphere.

As we used to say when I was a kid on New York City playgrounds, you want to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block. And that's simply because it's the best way to survive. If you're really powerful, nobody fools around with you. The United States is a regional hegemon. It's the only regional hegemon on the planet. We dominate the Western Hemisphere.

And what China has begun to do as it's got increasingly powerful economically is translate that economic might into military might. And it is trying to dominate Asia. It wants to push us out beyond the first island chain. It wants to push us out beyond the second island chain. It wants to be like we are in the Western hemisphere. And I don't blame the Chinese one bit.

And what China has begun to do as it's got increasingly powerful economically is translate that economic might into military might. And it is trying to dominate Asia. It wants to push us out beyond the first island chain. It wants to push us out beyond the second island chain. It wants to be like we are in the Western hemisphere. And I don't blame the Chinese one bit.

If I was the national security advisor in Beijing, that's what I'd be telling Xi Jinping we should be trying to do. But of course, from an American point of view, this is unacceptable. And we do not tolerate peer competitors. We do not want another regional hegemon on the planet. In the 20th century, there were four countries that threatened to become regional hegemons like us. Imperial Germany,

If I was the national security advisor in Beijing, that's what I'd be telling Xi Jinping we should be trying to do. But of course, from an American point of view, this is unacceptable. And we do not tolerate peer competitors. We do not want another regional hegemon on the planet. In the 20th century, there were four countries that threatened to become regional hegemons like us. Imperial Germany,

Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. The United States played a key role in putting all four of those countries on the scrap heap of history. We want to remain the only regional hegemon in the world. We are a ruthless great power. Never want to lose sight of that fact. And the end result of this is you get an intense security competition between China and The United States.

Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. The United States played a key role in putting all four of those countries on the scrap heap of history. We want to remain the only regional hegemon in the world. We are a ruthless great power. Never want to lose sight of that fact. And the end result of this is you get an intense security competition between China and The United States.

And it revolves around the concept of security, not prosperity. I think this is- Just very quickly. So what you see beginning to happen is that it's in all domains where the competition takes place, especially high tech. We do not want them defeating this.

And it revolves around the concept of security, not prosperity. I think this is- Just very quickly. So what you see beginning to happen is that it's in all domains where the competition takes place, especially high tech. We do not want them defeating this.

Defeating us in the high-tech war we are competing with them economically We are competing with the militarily and this is because the best way to survive is for us the United States of America to be the only regional hegemon on the planet

Defeating us in the high-tech war we are competing with them economically We are competing with the militarily and this is because the best way to survive is for us the United States of America to be the only regional hegemon on the planet

No, I like to refer to the Republicans and the Democrats as Tweedledee and Tweedledum. There's hardly any difference. I actually think the one exception is that former President Trump, when he became president in 2017, was bent on beating back the deep state and becoming a different kind of leader on the foreign policy front. But he basically failed.

No, I like to refer to the Republicans and the Democrats as Tweedledee and Tweedledum. There's hardly any difference. I actually think the one exception is that former President Trump, when he became president in 2017, was bent on beating back the deep state and becoming a different kind of leader on the foreign policy front. But he basically failed.

Jeff, what about the energy?

Jeff, what about the energy?

Just very quickly most of you have probably never asked yourself the question Why is the United States roaming all over the planet interfering in every country's business? It's in part because it's so powerful, but it's also because it's a regional hegemon Which means we have no threats in the Western Hemisphere so we are free to roam

Just very quickly most of you have probably never asked yourself the question Why is the United States roaming all over the planet interfering in every country's business? It's in part because it's so powerful, but it's also because it's a regional hegemon Which means we have no threats in the Western Hemisphere so we are free to roam

The great danger, Jeff, if China becomes a regional hegemon and doesn't have to worry about security concerns.

The great danger, Jeff, if China becomes a regional hegemon and doesn't have to worry about security concerns.

Then they behave like us. Can't we do better? That's exactly right. But my point to you, Jeff, is let's prevent that from happening by preventing them from becoming a regional hegemon. We don't want them to have freedom to roam. You were talking about them putting military bases in Mexico. That's our great fear.

Then they behave like us. Can't we do better? That's exactly right. But my point to you, Jeff, is let's prevent that from happening by preventing them from becoming a regional hegemon. We don't want them to have freedom to roam. You were talking about them putting military bases in Mexico. That's our great fear.

Jeff, that's because they're not a regional hegemon yet.

Jeff, that's because they're not a regional hegemon yet.

No, it's not just Taiwan. I mean, one could argue there's sort of three flashpoints in East Asia that you folks should keep your eye on. One is obviously Taiwan. Two is the South China Sea. And three is the East China Sea. And I think, David, that the place where a conflict is most likely today is not over Taiwan.

No, it's not just Taiwan. I mean, one could argue there's sort of three flashpoints in East Asia that you folks should keep your eye on. One is obviously Taiwan. Two is the South China Sea. And three is the East China Sea. And I think, David, that the place where a conflict is most likely today is not over Taiwan.

I could explain why I think Taiwan is not a serious problem at the moment or for the foreseeable future. The South China Sea is a very dangerous place. We could end up in a war for sure, even if we did not defend Taiwan. So Taiwan, you don't want to overemphasize. I agree with Jeff that we definitely don't want a war. And we certainly don't want a nuclear war.

I could explain why I think Taiwan is not a serious problem at the moment or for the foreseeable future. The South China Sea is a very dangerous place. We could end up in a war for sure, even if we did not defend Taiwan. So Taiwan, you don't want to overemphasize. I agree with Jeff that we definitely don't want a war. And we certainly don't want a nuclear war.

And he is absolutely correct that there's a risk of a nuclear war if a war breaks out of any sort between China and the United States. Many of us in the audience remember the Cold War, and this was an ever-present danger in the Cold War.

And he is absolutely correct that there's a risk of a nuclear war if a war breaks out of any sort between China and the United States. Many of us in the audience remember the Cold War, and this was an ever-present danger in the Cold War.

But my argument is that this is inevitable, because in a world where you don't have a higher authority and you care about your survival, you have a deep-seated interest, as any state in the system, to be as powerful as possible. And that means dominating your region of the world.

But my argument is that this is inevitable, because in a world where you don't have a higher authority and you care about your survival, you have a deep-seated interest, as any state in the system, to be as powerful as possible. And that means dominating your region of the world.

Well, we definitely view India as an ally. It's part of the Quad, which is this Rube Goldberg-type alliance structure that we put together in East Asia that includes Australia, Japan, the United States, and India. India is smartly maintaining its good relations with Russia. The Indians understand, like Jeff and I do, that the Russians are no great threat.

Well, we definitely view India as an ally. It's part of the Quad, which is this Rube Goldberg-type alliance structure that we put together in East Asia that includes Australia, Japan, the United States, and India. India is smartly maintaining its good relations with Russia. The Indians understand, like Jeff and I do, that the Russians are no great threat.

And he has vowed that if he gets elected this time, it will be different, and he will beat back the deep state. He will pursue a foreign policy that's fundamentally different than Republicans and Democrats have pursued up to now. And the big question on the table is whether or not you think Trump can beat the deep state and these two established parties. And I'd bet against Trump.

And he has vowed that if he gets elected this time, it will be different, and he will beat back the deep state. He will pursue a foreign policy that's fundamentally different than Republicans and Democrats have pursued up to now. And the big question on the table is whether or not you think Trump can beat the deep state and these two established parties. And I'd bet against Trump.

But from India's point of view, the real threat is China. And there are two places where India cares about China. One is on the India-China border up in the Himalayas, where they've actually had conflicts. And there's a real danger of war breaking out.

But from India's point of view, the real threat is China. And there are two places where India cares about China. One is on the India-China border up in the Himalayas, where they've actually had conflicts. And there's a real danger of war breaking out.

The second place, which is maybe even more dangerous, not at the moment, but will be over time, is the Indian Ocean, because the Chinese are imitating the United States. They not only want to be a regional hegemon, they want to develop power projection capability.

The second place, which is maybe even more dangerous, not at the moment, but will be over time, is the Indian Ocean, because the Chinese are imitating the United States. They not only want to be a regional hegemon, they want to develop power projection capability.

So the Chinese are building a blue-water navy that can come out of East Asia, through the Straits of Malacca, through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. And once you start talking about going through the Indian Ocean, the Indians get spooked. And that's when the Americans and the Indians come together.

So the Chinese are building a blue-water navy that can come out of East Asia, through the Straits of Malacca, through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. And once you start talking about going through the Indian Ocean, the Indians get spooked. And that's when the Americans and the Indians come together.

Let's let John in. Spicy. I just want to ask Jeff a question on this. My argument is that this is the way the world works.

Let's let John in. Spicy. I just want to ask Jeff a question on this. My argument is that this is the way the world works.

And it is. And it is. But if I'm describing how the world really works, how do you beat me?

And it is. And it is. But if I'm describing how the world really works, how do you beat me?

Two points. In my heart, I'm with Jeff. In my head, I'm not with Jeff. I wish he were right, but I don't believe he's right. To answer your question head on, I believe that there is no way out. We are in an iron cage. This is just the way international politics works. And it's because you're in an anarchic system

Two points. In my heart, I'm with Jeff. In my head, I'm not with Jeff. I wish he were right, but I don't believe he's right. To answer your question head on, I believe that there is no way out. We are in an iron cage. This is just the way international politics works. And it's because you're in an anarchic system

Yeah, I'll say a few words about it. When we talk about the deep state, we're talking really about the administrative state. It's very important to understand that starting in the late 19th, early 20th century, given developments in the American economy, it was imperative that we develop, and this was true of all Western countries, a very powerful central state that could run the country.

Yeah, I'll say a few words about it. When we talk about the deep state, we're talking really about the administrative state. It's very important to understand that starting in the late 19th, early 20th century, given developments in the American economy, it was imperative that we develop, and this was true of all Western countries, a very powerful central state that could run the country.

where you can never be sure that a really powerful state in the system won't come after you and inflict a century of national humiliation on you. So you go to great lengths to avoid that by trying to gain power at the expense of another power. And that leads to all sorts of trouble. Can war be avoided?

where you can never be sure that a really powerful state in the system won't come after you and inflict a century of national humiliation on you. So you go to great lengths to avoid that by trying to gain power at the expense of another power. And that leads to all sorts of trouble. Can war be avoided?

I like to distinguish between security competition, which I think is inevitable, and war, which is where security competition evolves into war. I think war can be avoided, and we were thankfully successful in that regard during the Cold War. And hopefully that will be the case in the US-China competition moving forward. Can I guarantee that? No. Does this disturb me greatly? Yes.

I like to distinguish between security competition, which I think is inevitable, and war, which is where security competition evolves into war. I think war can be avoided, and we were thankfully successful in that regard during the Cold War. And hopefully that will be the case in the US-China competition moving forward. Can I guarantee that? No. Does this disturb me greatly? Yes.

But again, this is just the tragic aspect of the world we live in.

But again, this is just the tragic aspect of the world we live in.

And Israelis.

And Israelis.

And over time, that state has grown in power. And since World War II, the United States, as you all know, has been involved in every nook and cranny of the world, fighting wars here, there, and everywhere. And to do that, you need a very powerful administrative state that can help manage that foreign policy.

And over time, that state has grown in power. And since World War II, the United States, as you all know, has been involved in every nook and cranny of the world, fighting wars here, there, and everywhere. And to do that, you need a very powerful administrative state that can help manage that foreign policy.

Let me answer your question about escalation potential, the Jordanians coming in. Israel faces three big problems, aside from problems with centrifugal forces inside the society. One is the Palestinian problem, which is both in Gaza and in the West Bank. That's one. Two is Hezbollah, and three is Iran.

Let me answer your question about escalation potential, the Jordanians coming in. Israel faces three big problems, aside from problems with centrifugal forces inside the society. One is the Palestinian problem, which is both in Gaza and in the West Bank. That's one. Two is Hezbollah, and three is Iran.

I think there is virtually no chance of what you described happening, which is if the Israelis were to go on a rampage in the West Bank, similar to what they've done in Gaza, that the Jordanians would come in or the Egyptians or the Saudis. They simply don't have the military capability. This is a scenario where the Israelis completely dominate.

I think there is virtually no chance of what you described happening, which is if the Israelis were to go on a rampage in the West Bank, similar to what they've done in Gaza, that the Jordanians would come in or the Egyptians or the Saudis. They simply don't have the military capability. This is a scenario where the Israelis completely dominate.

So in terms of escalation with regard to the Israel-Palestine problem, I don't think there's much potential. Hezbollah is a different issue, but mainly because it's linked with Iran, right? And Iran is the really dangerous flashpoint because, as you know, the Russians are now closely allied with the Iranians. The Chinese are moving in that direction as well.

So in terms of escalation with regard to the Israel-Palestine problem, I don't think there's much potential. Hezbollah is a different issue, but mainly because it's linked with Iran, right? And Iran is the really dangerous flashpoint because, as you know, the Russians are now closely allied with the Iranians. The Chinese are moving in that direction as well.

And if Israel gets involved in a war with Iran, we're going to come in, in all likelihood. Remember, when the Israelis attacked the Iranian embassy in Damascus on April 1st, on April 14th, The Iranians retaliated against it.

And if Israel gets involved in a war with Iran, we're going to come in, in all likelihood. Remember, when the Israelis attacked the Iranian embassy in Damascus on April 1st, on April 14th, The Iranians retaliated against it.

Yeah. But we were involved. We were forewarned, weren't we? Yes, we were forewarned. But the point is that we were involved in the fighting. We were involved with the Israelis, with the French, the British, the Jordanians, and the Saudis. We were all involved in the fighting. So this gets at the escalation problem.

Yeah. But we were involved. We were forewarned, weren't we? Yes, we were forewarned. But the point is that we were involved in the fighting. We were involved with the Israelis, with the French, the British, the Jordanians, and the Saudis. We were all involved in the fighting. So this gets at the escalation problem.

Now, to counter the Iranian escalation scenario, the fact is Iran does not want a war with the United States. And the United States does not want a war with Iran. And it's the Israelis, especially Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been trying to sort of suck us into a war.

Now, to counter the Iranian escalation scenario, the fact is Iran does not want a war with the United States. And the United States does not want a war with Iran. And it's the Israelis, especially Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been trying to sort of suck us into a war.

Because he wants us, the United States, to really whack Iran, weaken it militarily, and especially to go after its nuclear capabilities. Because as you well know, they are close to the point where they can develop nuclear weapons. So the Israelis are the ones who want us to get involved in a big war with Iran. That's the escalation flashpoint.

Because he wants us, the United States, to really whack Iran, weaken it militarily, and especially to go after its nuclear capabilities. Because as you well know, they are close to the point where they can develop nuclear weapons. So the Israelis are the ones who want us to get involved in a big war with Iran. That's the escalation flashpoint.

But in the process, what happens is you get all of these high-level bureaucrats, middle-level and low-level bureaucrats who become established in positions in the Pentagon, the State Department, the intelligence community, you name it, and they end up having a vested interest in pursuing a particular foreign policy.

But in the process, what happens is you get all of these high-level bureaucrats, middle-level and low-level bureaucrats who become established in positions in the Pentagon, the State Department, the intelligence community, you name it, and they end up having a vested interest in pursuing a particular foreign policy.

And the $64,000 question is whether you think the United States and Iran, kind of colluding, can work together to prevent the Israelis from getting a second.

And the $64,000 question is whether you think the United States and Iran, kind of colluding, can work together to prevent the Israelis from getting a second.

Well, if you believe that it matters who leads the next administration, that's true.

Well, if you believe that it matters who leads the next administration, that's true.

And the particular foreign policy that they like to pursue is the one that the Democrats and the Republicans are pushing. And that's why we talk about Tweedledee and Tweedledum with regard to the two parties you could throw in the deep state as being on the same page as those other two institutions.

And the particular foreign policy that they like to pursue is the one that the Democrats and the Republicans are pushing. And that's why we talk about Tweedledee and Tweedledum with regard to the two parties you could throw in the deep state as being on the same page as those other two institutions.

Great power politics is now back on the table.

Great power politics is now back on the table.

Two very quick points. First of all, I do believe that the people who are in favor of this foreign policy do believe in it. It's not cynical. They really believe that we're doing the right thing.

Two very quick points. First of all, I do believe that the people who are in favor of this foreign policy do believe in it. It's not cynical. They really believe that we're doing the right thing.

The second point I would make to you, and this sort of adds on to what Jeff said. Jeff said power has a lot to do with this. And as a good realist, I of course believe that. But it's also very important to understand that the United States is a fundamentally liberal country. And we believe that we have a right, we have a responsibility, and we have the power to run around the world

The second point I would make to you, and this sort of adds on to what Jeff said. Jeff said power has a lot to do with this. And as a good realist, I of course believe that. But it's also very important to understand that the United States is a fundamentally liberal country. And we believe that we have a right, we have a responsibility, and we have the power to run around the world

and remake the world in America's image. Most people in the foreign policy establishment, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, they believe that. And that is what has motivated our foreign policy in large part since the Cold War ended. Because remember, when the Cold War ends, we have no rival great power left. So what are we going to do with all this power that we have?

and remake the world in America's image. Most people in the foreign policy establishment, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, they believe that. And that is what has motivated our foreign policy in large part since the Cold War ended. Because remember, when the Cold War ends, we have no rival great power left. So what are we going to do with all this power that we have?

What we decide to do is go out and remake the world in our own image.

What we decide to do is go out and remake the world in our own image.

I want to be very clear. I am... Forever thankful that I was born in a liberal democracy, and I love liberalism. But the question here is, do you think that we can run around the world imposing liberal democracy on other countries, and in some cases, shoving it down their throat, doing it at the end of a rifle barrel? And my argument is, that's almost impossible to do. It almost always backfires.

I want to be very clear. I am... Forever thankful that I was born in a liberal democracy, and I love liberalism. But the question here is, do you think that we can run around the world imposing liberal democracy on other countries, and in some cases, shoving it down their throat, doing it at the end of a rifle barrel? And my argument is, that's almost impossible to do. It almost always backfires.

Think Iraq, Afghanistan, so forth and so on. And secondly, you begin to erode liberalism in the United States because you build a deep state, right? And you wanna understand that a lot of the complaints here about cracking down on freedom of speech and so forth and so on are related to the fact that we have this ambitious foreign policy. Those two things go together in very important ways.

Think Iraq, Afghanistan, so forth and so on. And secondly, you begin to erode liberalism in the United States because you build a deep state, right? And you wanna understand that a lot of the complaints here about cracking down on freedom of speech and so forth and so on are related to the fact that we have this ambitious foreign policy. Those two things go together in very important ways.

No, I don't think so. I think that what the United States should do is worry about its own national interest. In some cases, that's going to involve aligning ourselves with a dictator. If we're fighting World War II all over again, it's December 8th, 1941, you surely would be in favor of aligning with Adolf, not with Adolf Hitler, with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union against the

No, I don't think so. I think that what the United States should do is worry about its own national interest. In some cases, that's going to involve aligning ourselves with a dictator. If we're fighting World War II all over again, it's December 8th, 1941, you surely would be in favor of aligning with Adolf, not with Adolf Hitler, with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union against the

Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. Sometimes you have to make those kind of compromises. As I said before, I love liberal democracy. I have no problem aligning with liberal democracy. But when you begin to think in the terms that you're thinking, you end up with an impulse to do social engineering around the world. And that gets you in all sorts of problems.

Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. Sometimes you have to make those kind of compromises. As I said before, I love liberal democracy. I have no problem aligning with liberal democracy. But when you begin to think in the terms that you're thinking, you end up with an impulse to do social engineering around the world. And that gets you in all sorts of problems.

It depends.

It depends.

I mean, when Russia invades Ukraine, basically what you're saying is you wanna go to war on behalf of Ukraine against Russia? Are you in favor of that?

I mean, when Russia invades Ukraine, basically what you're saying is you wanna go to war on behalf of Ukraine against Russia? Are you in favor of that?