James Holland

But

The opening phase of Barbarossa has been a catastrophe.

And so as a consequence of Stalin refusing to let his men retreat back across the Dnieper, which is a substantial barrier and would be very difficult for the Germans to overwhelm had they moved back in time.

You know, that's another kind of 700,000 men put in the bag.

I mean, that's just staggering numbers. Yeah. But yeah, I mean, there's so many things wrong with the Barbarossa plan. You know, too much over... It's just such a vast area. I mean, you're talking about kind of, you know, 2,500 miles or something, you know, of frontage.

I mean, that's just staggering numbers. Yeah. But yeah, I mean, there's so many things wrong with the Barbarossa plan. You know, too much over... It's just such a vast area. I mean, you're talking about kind of, you know, 2,500 miles or something, you know, of frontage.

I mean, that's just staggering numbers. Yeah. But yeah, I mean, there's so many things wrong with the Barbarossa plan. You know, too much over... It's just such a vast area. I mean, you're talking about kind of, you know, 2,500 miles or something, you know, of frontage.

I mean, that's just staggering numbers.

Yeah.

But yeah, I mean, there's so many things wrong with the Barbarossa plan.

You know, too much over... It's just such a vast area.

I mean, you're talking about kind of, you know, 2,500 miles or something, you know, of frontage.

You know, maybe if you kind of put your panzer groups, which are these spearheads, and you put them all in one big thrust and just go hell for leather straight across on a kind of, you know, much more narrow front of, let's say, kind of 400 miles rather than 1,200. then they might have just sort of burnt away straight through to Moscow.

You know, maybe if you kind of put your panzer groups, which are these spearheads, and you put them all in one big thrust and just go hell for leather straight across on a kind of, you know, much more narrow front of, let's say, kind of 400 miles rather than 1,200. then they might have just sort of burnt away straight through to Moscow.

You know, maybe if you kind of put your panzer groups, which are these spearheads, and you put them all in one big thrust and just go hell for leather straight across on a kind of, you know, much more narrow front of, let's say, kind of 400 miles rather than 1,200. then they might have just sort of burnt away straight through to Moscow.

You know, maybe if you kind of put your panzer groups, which are these spearheads, and you put them all in one big thrust and just go hell for leather straight across on a kind of, you know, much more narrow front of, let's say, kind of 400 miles rather than 1,200.

then they might have just sort of burnt away straight through to Moscow.

Or was it just luck? No, I don't think so. I mean, I think what's happened is you've had the Soviet purges of the second half of the 1930s where they've, you know, they have executed or imprisoned 22,500 officers of which, you know, three out of five marshals, you know, God knows how many Army commanders, et cetera, et cetera.

Or was it just luck? No, I don't think so. I mean, I think what's happened is you've had the Soviet purges of the second half of the 1930s where they've, you know, they have executed or imprisoned 22,500 officers of which, you know, three out of five marshals, you know, God knows how many Army commanders, et cetera, et cetera.

Or was it just luck? No, I don't think so. I mean, I think what's happened is you've had the Soviet purges of the second half of the 1930s where they've, you know, they have executed or imprisoned 22,500 officers of which, you know, three out of five marshals, you know, God knows how many Army commanders, et cetera, et cetera.