Scott Chan

how can we best benefit from the convergence of of ai and power when i've got data centers that are being built in real estate they're being built and held in the infrastructure division in power we have an infrastructure division but it's it's also on the higher end of the risk curve in private equity it's somewhere in the middle in our sustainable investing group and so coordinating

how can we best benefit from the convergence of of ai and power when i've got data centers that are being built in real estate they're being built and held in the infrastructure division in power we have an infrastructure division but it's it's also on the higher end of the risk curve in private equity it's somewhere in the middle in our sustainable investing group and so coordinating

how can we best benefit from the convergence of of ai and power when i've got data centers that are being built in real estate they're being built and held in the infrastructure division in power we have an infrastructure division but it's it's also on the higher end of the risk curve in private equity it's somewhere in the middle in our sustainable investing group and so coordinating

All of that across CalSTRS would be really beneficial if we could connect the divisions together, but that takes time and we need to react more dynamically. So these are some of the challenges we're taking them head on. And I hope that, like I said, we'll develop them eventually into better advantages going forward.

All of that across CalSTRS would be really beneficial if we could connect the divisions together, but that takes time and we need to react more dynamically. So these are some of the challenges we're taking them head on. And I hope that, like I said, we'll develop them eventually into better advantages going forward.

All of that across CalSTRS would be really beneficial if we could connect the divisions together, but that takes time and we need to react more dynamically. So these are some of the challenges we're taking them head on. And I hope that, like I said, we'll develop them eventually into better advantages going forward.

I think you're right. We have to look for sizable imbalances that we think are going to last a long period of time so that CalSTRS can benefit. Let me just offer up three areas that over my experience, one I would say is crises provide a lot of supply-demand gaps in financing for long periods of time. Number two, and some of this we've alluded to, is new and emerging areas.

I think you're right. We have to look for sizable imbalances that we think are going to last a long period of time so that CalSTRS can benefit. Let me just offer up three areas that over my experience, one I would say is crises provide a lot of supply-demand gaps in financing for long periods of time. Number two, and some of this we've alluded to, is new and emerging areas.

I think you're right. We have to look for sizable imbalances that we think are going to last a long period of time so that CalSTRS can benefit. Let me just offer up three areas that over my experience, one I would say is crises provide a lot of supply-demand gaps in financing for long periods of time. Number two, and some of this we've alluded to, is new and emerging areas.

I think are at times you can see a supply demand gap that for a very long time for these changes, particularly around technology and innovation. And the third is complexity. Let me just kind of go through each one just briefly. But, you know, if I think about the crises like today, we're interested in the asset back part of private credit. I mentioned that to you.

I think are at times you can see a supply demand gap that for a very long time for these changes, particularly around technology and innovation. And the third is complexity. Let me just kind of go through each one just briefly. But, you know, if I think about the crises like today, we're interested in the asset back part of private credit. I mentioned that to you.

I think are at times you can see a supply demand gap that for a very long time for these changes, particularly around technology and innovation. And the third is complexity. Let me just kind of go through each one just briefly. But, you know, if I think about the crises like today, we're interested in the asset back part of private credit. I mentioned that to you.

Because banks and levered financial institutions have begun in earnest to move that segment off their balance sheet, right? They started with the direct lending and now they're moving to the asset back portion. But this goes all the way back to the global credit crisis of 08, 09, right? And even you saw this with Silicon Valley Bank.

Because banks and levered financial institutions have begun in earnest to move that segment off their balance sheet, right? They started with the direct lending and now they're moving to the asset back portion. But this goes all the way back to the global credit crisis of 08, 09, right? And even you saw this with Silicon Valley Bank.

Because banks and levered financial institutions have begun in earnest to move that segment off their balance sheet, right? They started with the direct lending and now they're moving to the asset back portion. But this goes all the way back to the global credit crisis of 08, 09, right? And even you saw this with Silicon Valley Bank.

you have this fundamental mismatch between the asset and liabilities of the bank. Essentially, the deposits could be short-term. How short-term? Well, they could evaporate within days. That's how short-term it is in seeing Silicon Valley Bank. And yet, some of their investments are going long-term. So there's this fundamental mismatch.

you have this fundamental mismatch between the asset and liabilities of the bank. Essentially, the deposits could be short-term. How short-term? Well, they could evaporate within days. That's how short-term it is in seeing Silicon Valley Bank. And yet, some of their investments are going long-term. So there's this fundamental mismatch.

you have this fundamental mismatch between the asset and liabilities of the bank. Essentially, the deposits could be short-term. How short-term? Well, they could evaporate within days. That's how short-term it is in seeing Silicon Valley Bank. And yet, some of their investments are going long-term. So there's this fundamental mismatch.

And that would be difficult enough to manage alone, but they're highly levered institutions on top of that. And so you're levering up this fundamental mismatch. If you think about that system, it's bound to go wrong. It's bound for something to go wrong. And in fact, every crisis in the U.S., you see 500 to 1,000 banks go under.

And that would be difficult enough to manage alone, but they're highly levered institutions on top of that. And so you're levering up this fundamental mismatch. If you think about that system, it's bound to go wrong. It's bound for something to go wrong. And in fact, every crisis in the U.S., you see 500 to 1,000 banks go under.