Joseph Cox

There's an element of that stereotype here in that the FBI went out and they collect all these messages all around the world, even though they couldn't monitor what was going on in America. This is sort of the future of policing that we're in now. And there wasn't really a debate about it.

It was just like one day or several days over the past few years, police have just decided that they're going to hack or otherwise intercept communications all around the world, basically. And we didn't really get a chance to talk about that as a society, about whether that's something we want. Maybe it turns out we do. Like, I don't know.

It was just like one day or several days over the past few years, police have just decided that they're going to hack or otherwise intercept communications all around the world, basically. And we didn't really get a chance to talk about that as a society, about whether that's something we want. Maybe it turns out we do. Like, I don't know.

But we can't have that conversation unless we know what's going on. And that's kind of what I was hoping to do with this book. pause and consider this.

But we can't have that conversation unless we know what's going on. And that's kind of what I was hoping to do with this book. pause and consider this.

I think that is something that cryptographers and privacy experts I spoke to in the book were worried about, which is that some of them are less worried about the specific case of a norm, while some are, to be clear, but they're more worried about, well, what happens now? If we have a network that's 90% criminal and 10% normal users, is that a fair target? I don't know.

I think that is something that cryptographers and privacy experts I spoke to in the book were worried about, which is that some of them are less worried about the specific case of a norm, while some are, to be clear, but they're more worried about, well, what happens now? If we have a network that's 90% criminal and 10% normal users, is that a fair target? I don't know.

What happens when it moves to 50-50? You know, and there's a really good quote in there from Matthew Green, the cryptologist, and he says that, well, maybe 50% of the criminals on this network are doing really, really bad stuff like trafficking or whatever. And then 50% are doing like, I don't know, copyright infringement of song lyrics, something that I don't think many people really care about.

What happens when it moves to 50-50? You know, and there's a really good quote in there from Matthew Green, the cryptologist, and he says that, well, maybe 50% of the criminals on this network are doing really, really bad stuff like trafficking or whatever. And then 50% are doing like, I don't know, copyright infringement of song lyrics, something that I don't think many people really care about.

In the eyes of law enforcement, is that a fair target? And that's the discussion we're not having. And we need to have that as quickly as possible, because otherwise law enforcement are just going to go ahead and do it.

In the eyes of law enforcement, is that a fair target? And that's the discussion we're not having. And we need to have that as quickly as possible, because otherwise law enforcement are just going to go ahead and do it.

Yeah, yeah. It's a worry, and that was a big worry in the Snowden ones. And in this case, it was like, even though the FBI couldn't look at phones in America, the AFP agreed to keep an eye on the ones on American soil for threats to life. And, you know, on one hand, you could say that, well, it's good the AFP were monitoring that so nobody got hurt, hopefully.

Yeah, yeah. It's a worry, and that was a big worry in the Snowden ones. And in this case, it was like, even though the FBI couldn't look at phones in America, the AFP agreed to keep an eye on the ones on American soil for threats to life. And, you know, on one hand, you could say that, well, it's good the AFP were monitoring that so nobody got hurt, hopefully.

On the other end, well, why didn't the FBI just get a warrant and do it themselves? Yeah.

On the other end, well, why didn't the FBI just get a warrant and do it themselves? Yeah.

Some of the phones landed in Dubai and, you know, part of the UAE. And the UAE is very interesting because it's one of the very few places that you're not allowed to just go around and start selling an encrypted phone or an encrypted app. If it is not approved by the government, you can get into a lot of trouble. You know, I guess sort of in the same way as like the Russian Federation, right?

Some of the phones landed in Dubai and, you know, part of the UAE. And the UAE is very interesting because it's one of the very few places that you're not allowed to just go around and start selling an encrypted phone or an encrypted app. If it is not approved by the government, you can get into a lot of trouble. You know, I guess sort of in the same way as like the Russian Federation, right?

It has to be approved by the government. It is basically a combination of a censorship and a surveillance sort of posture. Whereas if you are selling an encrypted app that the local authorities and national authorities do not approve of, you're not allowed to do that. And the reason being is that, well, they want to be able to access that.

It has to be approved by the government. It is basically a combination of a censorship and a surveillance sort of posture. Whereas if you are selling an encrypted app that the local authorities and national authorities do not approve of, you're not allowed to do that. And the reason being is that, well, they want to be able to access that.

And somebody running around selling Anom phones is not going to get on their good side.