James Currier

For 110 million. It was 90, but with the earn out, it ended up being 110 because we did really well after the acquisition. And it was five years to the week since we started the company. So we went through the downturn, came out the upturn, and then we sold at that time. And so here's a story about network effects. So we get to Monster, horribly run company.

For 110 million. It was 90, but with the earn out, it ended up being 110 because we did really well after the acquisition. And it was five years to the week since we started the company. So we went through the downturn, came out the upturn, and then we sold at that time. And so here's a story about network effects. So we get to Monster, horribly run company.

Management doesn't know what they're doing. There's bureaucracy. They have 600 people building the monster.com website, which we could do with three or four people. Like it was, and I was like, why are they worth 7 billion buying me for a hundred when our team is better, our products are better, et cetera.

Management doesn't know what they're doing. There's bureaucracy. They have 600 people building the monster.com website, which we could do with three or four people. Like it was, and I was like, why are they worth 7 billion buying me for a hundred when our team is better, our products are better, et cetera.

And I was like, oh, they got a network effect back in 1997, 98, where the employers and the employees are all coming to their marketplace. And so nobody can really leave. And so nobody can really compete with them. And that's why they're worth $7 billion is they had this network effect. And that's 2004 is when I fell in love with network effects.

And I was like, oh, they got a network effect back in 1997, 98, where the employers and the employees are all coming to their marketplace. And so nobody can really leave. And so nobody can really compete with them. And that's why they're worth $7 billion is they had this network effect. And that's 2004 is when I fell in love with network effects.

And I really started to understand, ah, if I'm going to do anything going forward, I got to have a network effect because I do not want to be in the fresh produce business.

And I really started to understand, ah, if I'm going to do anything going forward, I got to have a network effect because I do not want to be in the fresh produce business.

Right. NFX is the name of our venture firm. It stands for network effects.

Right. NFX is the name of our venture firm. It stands for network effects.

Because I never did it for the money. And this is the big reason why 90% of the exits in technology come out of the Bay Area. is because the culture here doesn't care about the money. The culture here cares about ego, cares about impact, cares about changing the world, cares about basically being a graffiti artist. Like you go out with a graffiti and you paint your tag.

Because I never did it for the money. And this is the big reason why 90% of the exits in technology come out of the Bay Area. is because the culture here doesn't care about the money. The culture here cares about ego, cares about impact, cares about changing the world, cares about basically being a graffiti artist. Like you go out with a graffiti and you paint your tag.

And then as you go by on the subway, you see your tag on that wall. We're graffiti artists out here. And so once you do one graffiti art, you want to do more graffiti art.

And then as you go by on the subway, you see your tag on that wall. We're graffiti artists out here. And so once you do one graffiti art, you want to do more graffiti art.

So that mindset means that once you get money, what do you do with it? You use it to build more things.

So that mindset means that once you get money, what do you do with it? You use it to build more things.

So what we did was we decided that at Tickle, we had built a testing business and a matchmaking business and a social networking business and an ad tech business. We had seven different P&Ls inside of Tickle as we were doing consumer stuff. So we were like, let's just build that endemically into it. Let's create an incubator. Let's get 30, 40, 50 people in here.

So what we did was we decided that at Tickle, we had built a testing business and a matchmaking business and a social networking business and an ad tech business. We had seven different P&Ls inside of Tickle as we were doing consumer stuff. So we were like, let's just build that endemically into it. Let's create an incubator. Let's get 30, 40, 50 people in here.

We'll work on three or four products at the same time. Most of them won't work. That's okay. We'll just iterate. We will iterate faster and cheaper than anybody else towards successes. And when something takes on, we'll jump on it. And so if you look at venture-backed companies at that time doing other consumer things, we were able to build things 10 times faster and 10 times cheaper.

We'll work on three or four products at the same time. Most of them won't work. That's okay. We'll just iterate. We will iterate faster and cheaper than anybody else towards successes. And when something takes on, we'll jump on it. And so if you look at venture-backed companies at that time doing other consumer things, we were able to build things 10 times faster and 10 times cheaper.