James Currier

On the opposite end of the spectrum, you have firms like Benchmark, where they're constantly thinking, how big could this be? How could this be massive? How could we look at our optimism and see what's going here? And I hadn't realized that there was that type of more optimistic investing. And that's why I never wanted to be a VC.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, you have firms like Benchmark, where they're constantly thinking, how big could this be? How could this be massive? How could we look at our optimism and see what's going here? And I hadn't realized that there was that type of more optimistic investing. And that's why I never wanted to be a VC.

But now we are bringing that sort of optimistic, almost naive approach to the investing, which doesn't work very well at Series B, but it kind of has to work at Pre-Seed and Seed where we operate because there's not much to go on.

But now we are bringing that sort of optimistic, almost naive approach to the investing, which doesn't work very well at Series B, but it kind of has to work at Pre-Seed and Seed where we operate because there's not much to go on.

And you have to think about what can go right. Because in the end, what matters to the venture capital fund is And what matters to your life and your ability to paint graffiti on the wall is the big outcomes. Like I will be associated with my Poshmark investment and with my DoorDash investment and my Lyft investment because those got big.

And you have to think about what can go right. Because in the end, what matters to the venture capital fund is And what matters to your life and your ability to paint graffiti on the wall is the big outcomes. Like I will be associated with my Poshmark investment and with my DoorDash investment and my Lyft investment because those got big.

You won't associate with my rap leaf investment, even though I made 35 times on that. Or maybe you'll associate with my Goodreads investment or not really with my Flickr investment because they weren't massive. And so in the end, this is a power law business, as everybody says, but you have to understand you're really looking for the big outcomes. So at seed, you have to just be optimistic.

You won't associate with my rap leaf investment, even though I made 35 times on that. Or maybe you'll associate with my Goodreads investment or not really with my Flickr investment because they weren't massive. And so in the end, this is a power law business, as everybody says, but you have to understand you're really looking for the big outcomes. So at seed, you have to just be optimistic.

And you have to be realistic. You have to have looked at hundreds of thousands of plans. You have to have invested in hundreds of companies and failed with most of them. You have to have a few successes where you see the patterns of success. And then you try to throw that all in and not get too negative all day long and not too cynical and keep swinging. and just keep swinging.

And you have to be realistic. You have to have looked at hundreds of thousands of plans. You have to have invested in hundreds of companies and failed with most of them. You have to have a few successes where you see the patterns of success. And then you try to throw that all in and not get too negative all day long and not too cynical and keep swinging. and just keep swinging.

Our first fund at 37 investments, second fund at 55, third fund at about 80. So we're taking a lot of swings per fund, looking for the three or four that are going to be worth $2, $4, $5 billion. And that's where we make our returns. That's where we have the most fun in terms of returns. But in the end, that's how you balance that negativity and positivity.

Our first fund at 37 investments, second fund at 55, third fund at about 80. So we're taking a lot of swings per fund, looking for the three or four that are going to be worth $2, $4, $5 billion. And that's where we make our returns. That's where we have the most fun in terms of returns. But in the end, that's how you balance that negativity and positivity.

No, we were just talking about this last week. It's one of the more difficult judgments to make about a founder. Are they smart? Are they fast? These are easier things to figure out in interviews. Are they ambitious? And we have a list of 48 attributes we're looking for.

No, we were just talking about this last week. It's one of the more difficult judgments to make about a founder. Are they smart? Are they fast? These are easier things to figure out in interviews. Are they ambitious? And we have a list of 48 attributes we're looking for.

And most of them are easy to, not easy, but you can figure it out in three or four or five meetings and looking at their track record and seeing how they respond to emails and seeing how the people around them behave and et cetera. There's lots of tip-offs.

And most of them are easy to, not easy, but you can figure it out in three or four or five meetings and looking at their track record and seeing how they respond to emails and seeing how the people around them behave and et cetera. There's lots of tip-offs.

But this issue about will they sell out when someone offers them $80 million for their company, which matters not to our venture fund, even at $400 million, it's really not that interesting. If you exit for $400 million, it's fine for our venture fund, but it's not going to really move the needle. You've got to get to $2 billion for it to move. It's a crazy business model.

But this issue about will they sell out when someone offers them $80 million for their company, which matters not to our venture fund, even at $400 million, it's really not that interesting. If you exit for $400 million, it's fine for our venture fund, but it's not going to really move the needle. You've got to get to $2 billion for it to move. It's a crazy business model.

I mean, the venture capital model is kind of crazy. That's why I say most businesses shouldn't raise venture capital, because most businesses don't have a shot to be a $2 billion to $4 billion to $10 billion company. But this is one of the hardest things to suss out. And what I will tell you is that one of the big things you can suss out is geography.

I mean, the venture capital model is kind of crazy. That's why I say most businesses shouldn't raise venture capital, because most businesses don't have a shot to be a $2 billion to $4 billion to $10 billion company. But this is one of the hardest things to suss out. And what I will tell you is that one of the big things you can suss out is geography.