Gillian Tett

Well, I think you raised a very interesting point there because the neoliberal economic model was also fostered by extreme tunnel vision that basically just looked at numbers to describe the human experience and essentially assumed that human beings were really just economic individuals, profit-seeking, maximizing individuals who were rational, operated consistently, independently from each other and

Well, I think you raised a very interesting point there because the neoliberal economic model was also fostered by extreme tunnel vision that basically just looked at numbers to describe the human experience and essentially assumed that human beings were really just economic individuals, profit-seeking, maximizing individuals who were rational, operated consistently, independently from each other and

and essentially assumed that the only things that mattered when you made economic models were the numbers, and that companies could be captured entirely by their balance sheets, tracking profit and loss, and that was all that mattered.

and essentially assumed that the only things that mattered when you made economic models were the numbers, and that companies could be captured entirely by their balance sheets, tracking profit and loss, and that was all that mattered.

And anthropologists have been howling for decades saying that actually economics, to quote Karl Polanyi, one of the great thinkers of the 20th century, economics is embedded in social relationships. And you can't just look at economics in terms of numbers. You have to realize a whole concept of power and social fabric and cultural fabric as well to understand what drives human beings.

And anthropologists have been howling for decades saying that actually economics, to quote Karl Polanyi, one of the great thinkers of the 20th century, economics is embedded in social relationships. And you can't just look at economics in terms of numbers. You have to realize a whole concept of power and social fabric and cultural fabric as well to understand what drives human beings.

And Pierre Bourdieu, the French intellectual, put out the idea that actually what defines power structures is not just controlling the economic capital, i.e. money, but also political capital, social capital, and cultural capital. And one way to make sense of Donald Trump is that he does indeed want to control not just money, but the political, cultural and social capital as well.

And Pierre Bourdieu, the French intellectual, put out the idea that actually what defines power structures is not just controlling the economic capital, i.e. money, but also political capital, social capital, and cultural capital. And one way to make sense of Donald Trump is that he does indeed want to control not just money, but the political, cultural and social capital as well.

And he wants rituals that affirm his power in a very performative way. Much of the way he behaves has been borrowed from the world of wrestling, which was, of to fame. And many of the cultural patterns, even down to the name calling and the manufactured fake fighting, has been taken into the way he conducts politics. So I do think you're absolutely right.

And he wants rituals that affirm his power in a very performative way. Much of the way he behaves has been borrowed from the world of wrestling, which was, of to fame. And many of the cultural patterns, even down to the name calling and the manufactured fake fighting, has been taken into the way he conducts politics. So I do think you're absolutely right.

I think that certainly what's driving him is not what classic neoliberal economists would recognize at all. It doesn't mean, though, that there aren't people around him who don't actually also have an economic vision. And it also doesn't mean that they frame what they're doing partly to the language of economics.

I think that certainly what's driving him is not what classic neoliberal economists would recognize at all. It doesn't mean, though, that there aren't people around him who don't actually also have an economic vision. And it also doesn't mean that they frame what they're doing partly to the language of economics.

Delighted to be with you.

Delighted to be with you.

I think that's a very fair way of actually framing it. I wouldn't pretend to know exactly what's in the mind of Donald Trump. I've met him a couple of times. And it seems to me from the outside that it's shifted in this term from the previous term in the sense of his confidence in his own instincts and his ability to execute on them is much more effective this time around than it was before.

I think that's a very fair way of actually framing it. I wouldn't pretend to know exactly what's in the mind of Donald Trump. I've met him a couple of times. And it seems to me from the outside that it's shifted in this term from the previous term in the sense of his confidence in his own instincts and his ability to execute on them is much more effective this time around than it was before.

But I do think he is primarily driven by the cultural goal that you mention, the cultural meme of making America great again in a sense of simply making it feel ascendant, dominant, and him being ascendant and dominant as part of that.

But I do think he is primarily driven by the cultural goal that you mention, the cultural meme of making America great again in a sense of simply making it feel ascendant, dominant, and him being ascendant and dominant as part of that.

It's interesting to look at the slogan because back in 2016, when he was running against Hillary Clinton, I spent quite a lot of time thinking about the difference in their slogans and how they played into how the electorate was behaving. And what struck me at the time was that Make America Great Again is a tagline of movement and agency. And it's a verb, it's action.

It's interesting to look at the slogan because back in 2016, when he was running against Hillary Clinton, I spent quite a lot of time thinking about the difference in their slogans and how they played into how the electorate was behaving. And what struck me at the time was that Make America Great Again is a tagline of movement and agency. And it's a verb, it's action.

And it basically throws down the gauntlet to everyone who hears about it to say, yay, I want to join in and actually be part of that, which is very different from the meme that essentially Hillary Clinton was using back then, which was stronger together or I'm with her, both of which are not essentially phrases with verbs. They're quite passive.

And it basically throws down the gauntlet to everyone who hears about it to say, yay, I want to join in and actually be part of that, which is very different from the meme that essentially Hillary Clinton was using back then, which was stronger together or I'm with her, both of which are not essentially phrases with verbs. They're quite passive.

And I think that making America great again is about a sense of movement. It's about a sense of agency, standing with people. And it's a very ill-defined concept around what greatness means. It can be determined simply in terms of economic might and numbers and keeping the dollar strong and building the American industrial base.

And I think that making America great again is about a sense of movement. It's about a sense of agency, standing with people. And it's a very ill-defined concept around what greatness means. It can be determined simply in terms of economic might and numbers and keeping the dollar strong and building the American industrial base.

It can also be determined, obviously, or defined in terms of military power Or you can have a moral component to it. For many, many years, people outside America assumed that America's greatness was partly about moral values, which were collectivist, collaborative, and the city on the shining hill, all of that, you know, democracy.

It can also be determined, obviously, or defined in terms of military power Or you can have a moral component to it. For many, many years, people outside America assumed that America's greatness was partly about moral values, which were collectivist, collaborative, and the city on the shining hill, all of that, you know, democracy.

But the vision that Donald Trump has been unleashing does not appear to be seen in that definition of greatness at all.

But the vision that Donald Trump has been unleashing does not appear to be seen in that definition of greatness at all.

Well, there's two ways to explain what's going on. One is that they are just totally confused themselves and different factions are fighting and that's why you get so much flip-flop of policy. The other way is that this is a deliberate strategy to destabilize opponents and give the US more leverage because your opponents will never know what's coming next.

Well, there's two ways to explain what's going on. One is that they are just totally confused themselves and different factions are fighting and that's why you get so much flip-flop of policy. The other way is that this is a deliberate strategy to destabilize opponents and give the US more leverage because your opponents will never know what's coming next.

They'll be terrified and they'll be essentially scared into doing whatever you want. I suspect, like most things, the truth lies somewhere in between.

They'll be terrified and they'll be essentially scared into doing whatever you want. I suspect, like most things, the truth lies somewhere in between.

But what is the big gamble they're taking is that using these tactics to get to their strategy of reorganizing the financial system and trading system and the overarching goal of making America great again, using these tactics maybe will terrify everyone else into submission, but

But what is the big gamble they're taking is that using these tactics to get to their strategy of reorganizing the financial system and trading system and the overarching goal of making America great again, using these tactics maybe will terrify everyone else into submission, but

Well, if you ask the team what they're doing, they will often revert to the slogan of make America great again. And that's not just a meme. It's also a guiding vision. And what they think that means is that they want to do a big reset for the global trading economic growth. financial and tech and military system and essentially ensure American supremacy and vibrancy for many years to come.

Well, if you ask the team what they're doing, they will often revert to the slogan of make America great again. And that's not just a meme. It's also a guiding vision. And what they think that means is that they want to do a big reset for the global trading economic growth. financial and tech and military system and essentially ensure American supremacy and vibrancy for many years to come.

But it's just as likely to both terrify everyone else into finding alternatives and hedging their bets and or becoming so discombobulated if you're a business that you'll use a classic English word that you can't actually plan for anything and the economy freezes up.

But it's just as likely to both terrify everyone else into finding alternatives and hedging their bets and or becoming so discombobulated if you're a business that you'll use a classic English word that you can't actually plan for anything and the economy freezes up.

And what's very striking is that in the early weeks of Trump's victory, there was a sense that animal spirits were being unleashed left, right and center. I can see that those are going to be quickly crushed if this uncertainty continues to weigh heavily on everybody.

And what's very striking is that in the early weeks of Trump's victory, there was a sense that animal spirits were being unleashed left, right and center. I can see that those are going to be quickly crushed if this uncertainty continues to weigh heavily on everybody.

Well, I think you put your finger on what is potentially one of the most interesting questions of all right now. And if you're going to translate that into investment language, essentially, there has been an assumption until very recently that there was something of a Trump put in the stock market that

Well, I think you put your finger on what is potentially one of the most interesting questions of all right now. And if you're going to translate that into investment language, essentially, there has been an assumption until very recently that there was something of a Trump put in the stock market that

And by that, I mean that if stocks began to fall to a certain level, essentially Trump would change course and unveil policy measures to push them back up again. And we've had this put concept dominate in recent years. What's happening now is that the concept for Trump put is beginning to implode because it's clear that stock markets are falling.

And by that, I mean that if stocks began to fall to a certain level, essentially Trump would change course and unveil policy measures to push them back up again. And we've had this put concept dominate in recent years. What's happening now is that the concept for Trump put is beginning to implode because it's clear that stock markets are falling.

And the fact that the Trump administration is essentially sitting on their hands can be interpreted as one or two things.

And the fact that the Trump administration is essentially sitting on their hands can be interpreted as one or two things.

One way to interpret it is that they're just trying to make the best of things and pretend they always plan to do this when they didn't and have a nice line to tell voters this is part of a kind of detox regime and that if their policies go wrong, then the pain was always part of the plan.

One way to interpret it is that they're just trying to make the best of things and pretend they always plan to do this when they didn't and have a nice line to tell voters this is part of a kind of detox regime and that if their policies go wrong, then the pain was always part of the plan.

The other way to look at it is to argue, well, actually, they did always recognize that their policies were going to be so dramatically disruptive and wrenching that they would create some kind of reaction in the markets. And they're trying to get everyone to recognize that that's simply inevitable.

The other way to look at it is to argue, well, actually, they did always recognize that their policies were going to be so dramatically disruptive and wrenching that they would create some kind of reaction in the markets. And they're trying to get everyone to recognize that that's simply inevitable.

Or there's a third potential explanation, which is that right now people like Scott Besant and Stephen Moran are being given their head by Trump and allowed to experiment, but at some point he's going to come in panic again. and pull them back in and change course dramatically yet again. And so under that scenario, the Trump put is actually still alive and well. Once again, we just don't know.

Or there's a third potential explanation, which is that right now people like Scott Besant and Stephen Moran are being given their head by Trump and allowed to experiment, but at some point he's going to come in panic again. and pull them back in and change course dramatically yet again. And so under that scenario, the Trump put is actually still alive and well. Once again, we just don't know.

But I think anyone who assumes the Trump put is automatically going to stay in place, as it seemed to do during the first administration, is going to have a very nasty shock going forward.

But I think anyone who assumes the Trump put is automatically going to stay in place, as it seemed to do during the first administration, is going to have a very nasty shock going forward.

Pretty startled, I think, is a fair explanation of what's going on on Wall Street. Because I think there was a feeling before Trump took office in January that everyone had kind of lived through the first Trump administration. It hadn't been as bad as people thought. In fact, in some ways, it had been quite good for parts of the economy.

Pretty startled, I think, is a fair explanation of what's going on on Wall Street. Because I think there was a feeling before Trump took office in January that everyone had kind of lived through the first Trump administration. It hadn't been as bad as people thought. In fact, in some ways, it had been quite good for parts of the economy.

and that most of what Trump said in his dramatic speeches couldn't be taken at face value. It should be taken seriously, but not literally, to cite the old tag. And so when documents like Project 2025 were floating around, which appeared to lay out the MAGA agenda.

and that most of what Trump said in his dramatic speeches couldn't be taken at face value. It should be taken seriously, but not literally, to cite the old tag. And so when documents like Project 2025 were floating around, which appeared to lay out the MAGA agenda.

When Trump said some really dramatic things on the campaign trail, there was a real tendency on Wall Street just to assume, well, he doesn't really mean it. He'll come in, he'll cut taxes, he'll deregulate a lot. It'll be great for business. It will be fine. And I should stress, it wasn't just the Wall Street traders who were saying that.

When Trump said some really dramatic things on the campaign trail, there was a real tendency on Wall Street just to assume, well, he doesn't really mean it. He'll come in, he'll cut taxes, he'll deregulate a lot. It'll be great for business. It will be fine. And I should stress, it wasn't just the Wall Street traders who were saying that.

The strategy to get there is really all about trying to move from what might be called a neoliberal mindset to move instead to what could be called a mercantilist mindset or a hegemonic power mindset. And that really is their vision for where they're going. And it affects how they see both trade and financial flows and tech.

The strategy to get there is really all about trying to move from what might be called a neoliberal mindset to move instead to what could be called a mercantilist mindset or a hegemonic power mindset. And that really is their vision for where they're going. And it affects how they see both trade and financial flows and tech.

I think many other governments around the world tend to assume that as well. When I spoke to people in Asia about what was likely to happen late last year, I was told quite strongly, well, we lived through it once already. It's going to be the same again. We'll just hunker down, batten the hatches and survive four years. It'll be fine.

I think many other governments around the world tend to assume that as well. When I spoke to people in Asia about what was likely to happen late last year, I was told quite strongly, well, we lived through it once already. It's going to be the same again. We'll just hunker down, batten the hatches and survive four years. It'll be fine.

So the fact that he has come in with a scale of disruption he has, which partly stemmed from the fact that he's very deliberately using executive power this time, not Congress, to try and implement his agenda. The fact that he appears to have people around him who have a very clear, coherent vision of where they want to go.

So the fact that he has come in with a scale of disruption he has, which partly stemmed from the fact that he's very deliberately using executive power this time, not Congress, to try and implement his agenda. The fact that he appears to have people around him who have a very clear, coherent vision of where they want to go.

And the fact that he has much higher levels of discipline internally this time around because of people like Susie Wiles, which means he's actually looking more effective, and he's potentially backed up by the law courts, all of that is creating a very different tenor to the first administration that's frankly shocked many people around the world.

And the fact that he has much higher levels of discipline internally this time around because of people like Susie Wiles, which means he's actually looking more effective, and he's potentially backed up by the law courts, all of that is creating a very different tenor to the first administration that's frankly shocked many people around the world.

The point I'd make is that anyone who wants to understand this or understand that what could happen next should watch the movie Love Actually and the wonderful scene where Billy Bob Thornton, who's playing the U.S. president, comes in and tries to bully Hugh Grant, the British prime minister, and the British unexpectedly fight back.

The point I'd make is that anyone who wants to understand this or understand that what could happen next should watch the movie Love Actually and the wonderful scene where Billy Bob Thornton, who's playing the U.S. president, comes in and tries to bully Hugh Grant, the British prime minister, and the British unexpectedly fight back.

Now, I'm not saying that's going to be a parallel exactly to what's going to happen in Britain or anywhere else, but the law of unintended consequences right now is enormous. So to cite a financial example of this, the sheer fact that America has been imposing sanctions on

Now, I'm not saying that's going to be a parallel exactly to what's going to happen in Britain or anywhere else, but the law of unintended consequences right now is enormous. So to cite a financial example of this, the sheer fact that America has been imposing sanctions on

on countries which try to seek alternatives to the dollar, is also just as likely to make everyone furtively and secretly try to imagine alternatives and try to hedge their bets. When I was in Asia recently, almost every single fund manager I spoke to is busy very quietly looking at ways of diversifying away from US treasuries, even as they continue to buy them.

on countries which try to seek alternatives to the dollar, is also just as likely to make everyone furtively and secretly try to imagine alternatives and try to hedge their bets. When I was in Asia recently, almost every single fund manager I spoke to is busy very quietly looking at ways of diversifying away from US treasuries, even as they continue to buy them.

So there's a tremendous sense of fragility here, which is very ironic given that they're all about strength.

So there's a tremendous sense of fragility here, which is very ironic given that they're all about strength.

It's all about power. And everything you should do will start with the recognition of who has power and who doesn't have power. So for them, it's really first and foremost about using every possible tool they can to bolster American power. The goal is to make America great again. The strategy is to reset the global financial and trading system.

It's all about power. And everything you should do will start with the recognition of who has power and who doesn't have power. So for them, it's really first and foremost about using every possible tool they can to bolster American power. The goal is to make America great again. The strategy is to reset the global financial and trading system.

Well, it really boils down to the question of whether you think you need to use sticks or carrots. And they don't appear to believe in carrots at the moment. And using just sticks has limits.

Well, it really boils down to the question of whether you think you need to use sticks or carrots. And they don't appear to believe in carrots at the moment. And using just sticks has limits.

You can look at the fact that actually, in spite of the fact that America appears to be trying to dampen down global trade by imposing all these tariffs, trade is actually continuing to rise across the world as a whole quite rapidly because other countries are trading more with each other.

You can look at the fact that actually, in spite of the fact that America appears to be trying to dampen down global trade by imposing all these tariffs, trade is actually continuing to rise across the world as a whole quite rapidly because other countries are trading more with each other.

You could also look at the fact that America has spent the last few years trying to kill the Chinese semiconductor industry by refusing to sell all kinds of sensitive technology. And what that has done is essentially encouraged China to become even more self-sufficient, even faster in response.

You could also look at the fact that America has spent the last few years trying to kill the Chinese semiconductor industry by refusing to sell all kinds of sensitive technology. And what that has done is essentially encouraged China to become even more self-sufficient, even faster in response.

And so now, in a sense, America is almost losing some of its leverage precisely because it uses sticks so aggressively. So that's one of the big dangers. And I don't think they fully recognize that.

And so now, in a sense, America is almost losing some of its leverage precisely because it uses sticks so aggressively. So that's one of the big dangers. And I don't think they fully recognize that.

I think that they would say, yes, America has risen on the back of some elements of international cooperation for sure, but what they would regard as a rip-off element has been ignored for a very long time. and that you have to implement countervailing countermeasures in a draconian way to try and rebalance it.

I think that they would say, yes, America has risen on the back of some elements of international cooperation for sure, but what they would regard as a rip-off element has been ignored for a very long time. and that you have to implement countervailing countermeasures in a draconian way to try and rebalance it.

People like Bob Lighthizer or Peter Navarro or others were under such strong intellectual attack for so long by the neoliberals. And their views were so unfashionable that they became used to the idea that they had to fight extremely hard and shout extremely loud to even begin to enter the conversation. And what is interesting now is that in some ways,

People like Bob Lighthizer or Peter Navarro or others were under such strong intellectual attack for so long by the neoliberals. And their views were so unfashionable that they became used to the idea that they had to fight extremely hard and shout extremely loud to even begin to enter the conversation. And what is interesting now is that in some ways,

the argument has been moving towards their positions even before Trump came into the White House. So frankly, they don't need to shout as loudly as they used to. But I think there is still this rather embattled siege mentality operating amongst many of the Trumpians to prove that the points they were making for many, many years are relevant and valid and to disprove their critics.

the argument has been moving towards their positions even before Trump came into the White House. So frankly, they don't need to shout as loudly as they used to. But I think there is still this rather embattled siege mentality operating amongst many of the Trumpians to prove that the points they were making for many, many years are relevant and valid and to disprove their critics.

And the tactics are to use essentially threats, capricious, uncertain, bullying, tariffs, military power, all of those as ways of getting leverage to achieve that.

And the tactics are to use essentially threats, capricious, uncertain, bullying, tariffs, military power, all of those as ways of getting leverage to achieve that.

Well, I interviewed the prime minister of Vietnam a few weeks ago at Davos, the World Economic Forum. And, you know, he is busy, like most more countries, frantically trying to work out what he can do to appease the new emperor in town. You know, the best way to understand the way that Donald Trump exercises power is to imagine

Well, I interviewed the prime minister of Vietnam a few weeks ago at Davos, the World Economic Forum. And, you know, he is busy, like most more countries, frantically trying to work out what he can do to appease the new emperor in town. You know, the best way to understand the way that Donald Trump exercises power is to imagine

the court of Louis XIV in Versailles in Paris or King Henry VIII in London. It's all about competing courtiers and, as you said earlier, about bringing tributes to try and appease the king. So the Vietnamese government's been looking for ways to appease the emperor by offering to buy lots more aeroplanes. They're talking about 50 or 100 more aeroplanes.

the court of Louis XIV in Versailles in Paris or King Henry VIII in London. It's all about competing courtiers and, as you said earlier, about bringing tributes to try and appease the king. So the Vietnamese government's been looking for ways to appease the emperor by offering to buy lots more aeroplanes. They're talking about 50 or 100 more aeroplanes.

There's gossip that they'll let Trump build a casino in Vietnam or... all these other things that they can do. And yet, at the same time, they're also stressing that they're not going to abandon their relationship with China. They're trying to play it both ways and essentially hedging their bets quietly out of the limelight. So I think that's the pattern of most poor countries right now.

There's gossip that they'll let Trump build a casino in Vietnam or... all these other things that they can do. And yet, at the same time, they're also stressing that they're not going to abandon their relationship with China. They're trying to play it both ways and essentially hedging their bets quietly out of the limelight. So I think that's the pattern of most poor countries right now.

Well, I think that China, like America, now is all about transactional deals, not ideology. And that they think that to cut transactional deals effectively, you have to be strong. And yes, as part of that transactional deal-making and to bolster their own power, they probably would like to gather together other countries under their wing. And yes, we probably will see escalation.

Well, I think that China, like America, now is all about transactional deals, not ideology. And that they think that to cut transactional deals effectively, you have to be strong. And yes, as part of that transactional deal-making and to bolster their own power, they probably would like to gather together other countries under their wing. And yes, we probably will see escalation.

The framework that I use when I look at that is a framework developed by Ray Dalio at Bridgewater, which says there are not just one way to have wars. You can have trade wars, you can have tech wars, you can have cyber wars, you can have capital wars, i.e. the movement of money, and then you have shooting wars. So we already have trade wars and tech wars and cyber wars.

The framework that I use when I look at that is a framework developed by Ray Dalio at Bridgewater, which says there are not just one way to have wars. You can have trade wars, you can have tech wars, you can have cyber wars, you can have capital wars, i.e. the movement of money, and then you have shooting wars. So we already have trade wars and tech wars and cyber wars.

We're starting to tiptoe around the edge of capital wars. I hope to heavens we don't get anywhere near a shooting war. But right now, certainly the conflicts and the sense of tension is escalating, and that's pretty alarming all around.

We're starting to tiptoe around the edge of capital wars. I hope to heavens we don't get anywhere near a shooting war. But right now, certainly the conflicts and the sense of tension is escalating, and that's pretty alarming all around.

Well, at the moment, we don't know exactly what the Mar-a-Lago Accord is. And I should stress that because it's still being thrashed out. It hasn't been announced. It's possible it may never be announced. But very broadly speaking, what they're seeking to do with the Mar-a-Lago Accord are two potentially quite contradictory things.

Well, at the moment, we don't know exactly what the Mar-a-Lago Accord is. And I should stress that because it's still being thrashed out. It hasn't been announced. It's possible it may never be announced. But very broadly speaking, what they're seeking to do with the Mar-a-Lago Accord are two potentially quite contradictory things.

Well, much of what we thought was normal in the mid to late 20th century is being ripped up. And we're going back to not just the early 20th century in economic policy, but if you like, almost pre-industrialized countries in terms of these princely power structures and tributes and things.

Well, much of what we thought was normal in the mid to late 20th century is being ripped up. And we're going back to not just the early 20th century in economic policy, but if you like, almost pre-industrialized countries in terms of these princely power structures and tributes and things.

The danger of having a tribute-based hierarchy, which is all about personal relationships and power, is that it can be capricious. It can be unpredictable. It means people don't have the confidence to plan properly. It can be obviously quite costly. And it reinforces a lot of corruption and general unpleasant behavior.

The danger of having a tribute-based hierarchy, which is all about personal relationships and power, is that it can be capricious. It can be unpredictable. It means people don't have the confidence to plan properly. It can be obviously quite costly. And it reinforces a lot of corruption and general unpleasant behavior.

Insofar as their benefits, well, if you're being very cynical and transactional, some countries and some business leaders today would say, if all it takes to keep the new king slash emperor happy is to give him a new casino, give him a few plaudits, invoke his name, clap him a lot, then it's fine. And we'll get the government of our back and we can do whatever we want.

Insofar as their benefits, well, if you're being very cynical and transactional, some countries and some business leaders today would say, if all it takes to keep the new king slash emperor happy is to give him a new casino, give him a few plaudits, invoke his name, clap him a lot, then it's fine. And we'll get the government of our back and we can do whatever we want.

So from a cynical perspective, you know, some people would say, actually, it's not such a high price to pay. But it certainly engenders a sense that morality is entirely relative, or to be more accurate, we live now in an honor-based system, not a shame-based system. And that essentially, we're back to something that looks more like tribal leadership in Afghanistan.

So from a cynical perspective, you know, some people would say, actually, it's not such a high price to pay. But it certainly engenders a sense that morality is entirely relative, or to be more accurate, we live now in an honor-based system, not a shame-based system. And that essentially, we're back to something that looks more like tribal leadership in Afghanistan.

I think that the bond market in many ways is much more important than the stock market, because although the stock market used to be a barometer of success in the eyes of Donald Trump, the bond market is where the critical lifeblood for the American body politic and economy actually runs through rests, if you like. And America's debt is exploding, 36 trillion and counting.

I think that the bond market in many ways is much more important than the stock market, because although the stock market used to be a barometer of success in the eyes of Donald Trump, the bond market is where the critical lifeblood for the American body politic and economy actually runs through rests, if you like. And America's debt is exploding, 36 trillion and counting.

And that's becoming more and more costly. The cost of servicing the debt, paying the interest, is now bigger than the defense budget. So you take that all together and it's a challenging situation.

And that's becoming more and more costly. The cost of servicing the debt, paying the interest, is now bigger than the defense budget. So you take that all together and it's a challenging situation.

If you throw on top of that the fact that many investors think that inflation will rise, which makes bonds less attractive, if you chuck in the fact that the debt keeps going up and up and will keep increasing if they do big tax cuts, if you chuck in the fact that the Federal Reserve's independence is being undermined,

If you throw on top of that the fact that many investors think that inflation will rise, which makes bonds less attractive, if you chuck in the fact that the debt keeps going up and up and will keep increasing if they do big tax cuts, if you chuck in the fact that the Federal Reserve's independence is being undermined,

by what Donald Trump says, which could potentially create more inflation and cause markets to lose confidence. That is not a good combination of factors to have when you want to sell lots and lots of bonds at all. And thus far, they've got away with it fine. In fact, the bond yields have gone down. And thus far, it seems that foreigners are still buying a lot of American debt.

by what Donald Trump says, which could potentially create more inflation and cause markets to lose confidence. That is not a good combination of factors to have when you want to sell lots and lots of bonds at all. And thus far, they've got away with it fine. In fact, the bond yields have gone down. And thus far, it seems that foreigners are still buying a lot of American debt.

On the one hand, they want to ensure that the dollar remains supreme as a global reserve currency and that the dollar-based financial system continues to dominate. And that's really important because when you look at what the source of American hegemonic power is today, it's not really manufacturing because that's with China that's got a stranglehold in so many parts of the supply chain.

On the one hand, they want to ensure that the dollar remains supreme as a global reserve currency and that the dollar-based financial system continues to dominate. And that's really important because when you look at what the source of American hegemonic power is today, it's not really manufacturing because that's with China that's got a stranglehold in so many parts of the supply chain.

But it could be quite fragile for two reasons. Firstly, if China starts to essentially get more aggressive in its dealings with America and stops buying debt for a while or simply reduces its presence in the auctions, that could create a very nasty reaction. And then secondly, a large part of the debt today or the bond market seems to be in the hands of hedge funds.

But it could be quite fragile for two reasons. Firstly, if China starts to essentially get more aggressive in its dealings with America and stops buying debt for a while or simply reduces its presence in the auctions, that could create a very nasty reaction. And then secondly, a large part of the debt today or the bond market seems to be in the hands of hedge funds.

And the IMF itself has estimated that the hedge funds now count for around 11% of the holdings. And that implies that if something causes them to cut and run and panic, you could see a very big wave of selling pressure suddenly in treasuries. And the underlying plumbing of the Treasuries market is not strong at all. We've seen flash crashes erupt on several occasions in the last few years.

And the IMF itself has estimated that the hedge funds now count for around 11% of the holdings. And that implies that if something causes them to cut and run and panic, you could see a very big wave of selling pressure suddenly in treasuries. And the underlying plumbing of the Treasuries market is not strong at all. We've seen flash crashes erupt on several occasions in the last few years.

So it's not impossible to imagine a quite nasty cocktail of things essentially creating new havoc in the Treasuries market, a bit like we saw at the beginning of COVID back in 2020.

So it's not impossible to imagine a quite nasty cocktail of things essentially creating new havoc in the Treasuries market, a bit like we saw at the beginning of COVID back in 2020.

Well, all of the factions around Trump say they want to cut the debt, and it's an area on which I would strongly agree. The debt needs to be cut. The tactics they want to use differ significantly.

Well, all of the factions around Trump say they want to cut the debt, and it's an area on which I would strongly agree. The debt needs to be cut. The tactics they want to use differ significantly.

Somebody like Stephen Bannon, who has been looking at the financial markets for years, has said in public that he's very alarmed about the debt trajectory and assumes that it's going to have to force them to raise taxes on the rich eventually.

Somebody like Stephen Bannon, who has been looking at the financial markets for years, has said in public that he's very alarmed about the debt trajectory and assumes that it's going to have to force them to raise taxes on the rich eventually.

And cut defense spending, yes, which is absolutely different from what people inside much of the congressional Republican groups would say they want to see. They want to see, for the most part, much more traditional cuts to the government, coupled with often more tax cuts.

And cut defense spending, yes, which is absolutely different from what people inside much of the congressional Republican groups would say they want to see. They want to see, for the most part, much more traditional cuts to the government, coupled with often more tax cuts.

And then, of course, you get the techno-libertarians who just want to have tax cuts and no government and slash the government to the bone. So it's a very different sort of set of ideas floating around. Whether or not it will work is anyone's guess right now.

And then, of course, you get the techno-libertarians who just want to have tax cuts and no government and slash the government to the bone. So it's a very different sort of set of ideas floating around. Whether or not it will work is anyone's guess right now.

But the last point to make is insofar as the thinking around how to cut the debt amongst the economists who are developing these radical ideas, it really rests on the idea that you can grow your way out of the debt. And if they deregulate enough and essentially unleash enough animal spirits, then the economy will grow so fast that the debt would fall naturally in their views.

But the last point to make is insofar as the thinking around how to cut the debt amongst the economists who are developing these radical ideas, it really rests on the idea that you can grow your way out of the debt. And if they deregulate enough and essentially unleash enough animal spirits, then the economy will grow so fast that the debt would fall naturally in their views.

No, it's usually a kind of Hail Mary pass.

No, it's usually a kind of Hail Mary pass.

It's actually the dollar-based financial system, which the American Federal Reserve and Treasury really does dominate. So they want to stay dominant in that field. But at the same time, they also think that the dollar is overvalued by virtue of the fact that it is the world's reserve currency, which means that people keep buying dollars. And so that pushes up the value.

It's actually the dollar-based financial system, which the American Federal Reserve and Treasury really does dominate. So they want to stay dominant in that field. But at the same time, they also think that the dollar is overvalued by virtue of the fact that it is the world's reserve currency, which means that people keep buying dollars. And so that pushes up the value.

Well, that is a math that Scott Besant is presenting at the moment. Of course, the other way you can also get rid of the debt is by restructuring or defaulting, which has always been assumed that America wouldn't do.

Well, that is a math that Scott Besant is presenting at the moment. Of course, the other way you can also get rid of the debt is by restructuring or defaulting, which has always been assumed that America wouldn't do.

And what they are trailing as one of the ideas they're thinking about through this concept of forcing so-called allies to swap their holdings of treasuries and dollars and gold for perpetual bonds, long-term bond instruments, is actually tantamount to a quasi-debt restructuring. And how the markets would react to that is anyone's guess.

And what they are trailing as one of the ideas they're thinking about through this concept of forcing so-called allies to swap their holdings of treasuries and dollars and gold for perpetual bonds, long-term bond instruments, is actually tantamount to a quasi-debt restructuring. And how the markets would react to that is anyone's guess.

Well, essentially, the vision is that countries which have large stocks of gold or dollars, or mid to short term dollar bonds, like Japan, say, which is the second biggest holder of US treasuries in the world right now, that because they rely on the US military for protection, they

Well, essentially, the vision is that countries which have large stocks of gold or dollars, or mid to short term dollar bonds, like Japan, say, which is the second biggest holder of US treasuries in the world right now, that because they rely on the US military for protection, they

and because they want access to the American market, will essentially agree to being bullied into converting some of their treasury holdings into long-term perpetual instruments, which won't be liquid in the sense you can trade them in the markets, but can be swapped through the Federal Reserve for other dollar assets.

and because they want access to the American market, will essentially agree to being bullied into converting some of their treasury holdings into long-term perpetual instruments, which won't be liquid in the sense you can trade them in the markets, but can be swapped through the Federal Reserve for other dollar assets.

So for the Japanese point of view, it's a pretty bad deal because what they have at the moment will be swapped out for something worse unless you put issues around, say, military protection or tariffs into the mix as well and use that to either force them to comply or encourage them to comply by offering them incentives. So that's the idea floating around. Maybe it would work with Japan.

So for the Japanese point of view, it's a pretty bad deal because what they have at the moment will be swapped out for something worse unless you put issues around, say, military protection or tariffs into the mix as well and use that to either force them to comply or encourage them to comply by offering them incentives. So that's the idea floating around. Maybe it would work with Japan.

Maybe it will work with a few other smaller countries. It won't work with hedge funds, I'm sure. And it won't work with many other countries either.

Maybe it will work with a few other smaller countries. It won't work with hedge funds, I'm sure. And it won't work with many other countries either.

And that's made American manufacturing and industry less competitive and contributed to the hollowing out that they really don't like. So their vision for trying to reconcile the fact they want to keep the dollar dominant, but they also want to weaken its value, is a so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord, which would essentially entail a number of countries coming together to agree to weaken the dollar and

And that's made American manufacturing and industry less competitive and contributed to the hollowing out that they really don't like. So their vision for trying to reconcile the fact they want to keep the dollar dominant, but they also want to weaken its value, is a so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord, which would essentially entail a number of countries coming together to agree to weaken the dollar and

Well, when I listen to them with my anthropology hat on, trying to put myself into their mind and absorb their worldview without judgment, which is what anthropologists are trying to do, what I hear is a belief that if they can detox the American economy, wean it off its addiction to debt and to excessively large quantities of cheap imports, then

Well, when I listen to them with my anthropology hat on, trying to put myself into their mind and absorb their worldview without judgment, which is what anthropologists are trying to do, what I hear is a belief that if they can detox the American economy, wean it off its addiction to debt and to excessively large quantities of cheap imports, then

and wean it off its addition to financialization, meaning that the economy is driven by excess money rather than actually making genuine things, that you'll end up with an economy that is more focused on industry, more self-sufficient, more focused on creating good jobs for working class people,

and wean it off its addition to financialization, meaning that the economy is driven by excess money rather than actually making genuine things, that you'll end up with an economy that is more focused on industry, more self-sufficient, more focused on creating good jobs for working class people,

And essentially stronger as well and dominant as well and less at risk of being disrupted by potential foes who might control parts of the supply chain like China. That sort of seems to be their vision. Do I buy it?

And essentially stronger as well and dominant as well and less at risk of being disrupted by potential foes who might control parts of the supply chain like China. That sort of seems to be their vision. Do I buy it?

Personally, with my non-anthropologist hat on, speaking as an economic journalist, I find it very hard to believe that it's going to work without major disruption and big bumps along the way at best. And the vision of brutal power politics, hegemonic power, trampling on the weak, trampling on your foes, I find very distasteful.

Personally, with my non-anthropologist hat on, speaking as an economic journalist, I find it very hard to believe that it's going to work without major disruption and big bumps along the way at best. And the vision of brutal power politics, hegemonic power, trampling on the weak, trampling on your foes, I find very distasteful.

And as someone who also spends a lot of time thinking about economic history and is head of King's College in Cambridge, which was where John Mennon Keynes was based, I'm also haunted by the fact that in 1919, after World War I,

And as someone who also spends a lot of time thinking about economic history and is head of King's College in Cambridge, which was where John Mennon Keynes was based, I'm also haunted by the fact that in 1919, after World War I,

John Maynard Keynes wrote a haunting pamphlet called The Economic Consequence of the Peace, in which he pointed out that globalization pre-World War I had been very good for people, so had free markets and the free movement of people and innovation. And that had delivered a huge economic boom. That was obviously disrupted after World War I. And after World War I, the governments had a choice.

John Maynard Keynes wrote a haunting pamphlet called The Economic Consequence of the Peace, in which he pointed out that globalization pre-World War I had been very good for people, so had free markets and the free movement of people and innovation. And that had delivered a huge economic boom. That was obviously disrupted after World War I. And after World War I, the governments had a choice.

They could either go back to globalization, free market capitalism, and some element of collaboration, or they could go down the path of revenge politics and punitive policies that tried to essentially hurt other countries. He begged them, John Manny Keynes, to go down the first path and warned that if they went down the second, he would simply stoke up more hatred and lead to World War II.

They could either go back to globalization, free market capitalism, and some element of collaboration, or they could go down the path of revenge politics and punitive policies that tried to essentially hurt other countries. He begged them, John Manny Keynes, to go down the first path and warned that if they went down the second, he would simply stoke up more hatred and lead to World War II.

Unfortunately, his pleas were ignored. And we actually did in the 1930s, it was all about revenge politics with disastrous consequences. And so when I look at the revenge politics and the punitive measures and the beggar thy neighbor approaches being endorsed by the Trump regime, I think we're back to the beginning of the 1930s. And it terrifies me.

Unfortunately, his pleas were ignored. And we actually did in the 1930s, it was all about revenge politics with disastrous consequences. And so when I look at the revenge politics and the punitive measures and the beggar thy neighbor approaches being endorsed by the Trump regime, I think we're back to the beginning of the 1930s. And it terrifies me.

Well, I'm going to recommend books that I think are outside the mainstream, because I think it's worth looking at history and anthropology right now. So the first one I'd recommend is Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade from 1945, which is something that's gone completely out of fashion in recent years, but shed a lot of light on where we are today.

Well, I'm going to recommend books that I think are outside the mainstream, because I think it's worth looking at history and anthropology right now. So the first one I'd recommend is Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade from 1945, which is something that's gone completely out of fashion in recent years, but shed a lot of light on where we are today.

I would recommend John Minicane's The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which, just read the first third, the last two thirds are not worth reading. But I mention those two books because they are economic tracks, history tracks, that I think probably most of the audience hasn't read, but should definitely dust off again now.

I would recommend John Minicane's The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which, just read the first third, the last two thirds are not worth reading. But I mention those two books because they are economic tracks, history tracks, that I think probably most of the audience hasn't read, but should definitely dust off again now.

And in exchange, America offering some form of tariff relief, some form of military protection, being allies, and potentially doing other things like maybe swapping long-term US debt for other forms of debt. It's extraordinarily bold. Who knows whether it will actually happen? Who knows whether America will actually be able to persuade or bully other countries to take part in this or not?

And in exchange, America offering some form of tariff relief, some form of military protection, being allies, and potentially doing other things like maybe swapping long-term US debt for other forms of debt. It's extraordinarily bold. Who knows whether it will actually happen? Who knows whether America will actually be able to persuade or bully other countries to take part in this or not?

And I'd recommend another book, David Graeber's Debt, the First 5,000 Years, which looks at what you do with debt systems from a very long-term perspective. and makes a point about the fact that debt is always about power. Default has happened in many forms many times, and no one can assume that any empire or powerful regime will last forever.

And I'd recommend another book, David Graeber's Debt, the First 5,000 Years, which looks at what you do with debt systems from a very long-term perspective. and makes a point about the fact that debt is always about power. Default has happened in many forms many times, and no one can assume that any empire or powerful regime will last forever.

If you want to get a very quick take on what anthropology is, there's a book by Matthew Angelke called Think Like an Anthropologist that summarizes some of the key ideas in anthropology. And there's a wonderful section in there about different power structures and the concept of honor and shame and how that can play out in different cultures. It's very relevant to today.

If you want to get a very quick take on what anthropology is, there's a book by Matthew Angelke called Think Like an Anthropologist that summarizes some of the key ideas in anthropology. And there's a wonderful section in there about different power structures and the concept of honor and shame and how that can play out in different cultures. It's very relevant to today.

Thank you very much indeed. And it's always a great pleasure both reading you and listening to you.

Thank you very much indeed. And it's always a great pleasure both reading you and listening to you.

So it's all very uncertain, but it certainly represents a very dramatic breakpoint from the type of intellectual consensus we've had driving policymaking in recent years.

So it's all very uncertain, but it certainly represents a very dramatic breakpoint from the type of intellectual consensus we've had driving policymaking in recent years.

The strategy about a wider reset of the global financial and trading system has actually been bubbling as a set of intellectual debates for a long time, well before Donald Trump actually won the election. You can go back to almost a year ago and see Scott Besant, the Treasury Secretary, giving speeches talking about a new Bretton Woods moment and a Bretton Woods realignment in

The strategy about a wider reset of the global financial and trading system has actually been bubbling as a set of intellectual debates for a long time, well before Donald Trump actually won the election. You can go back to almost a year ago and see Scott Besant, the Treasury Secretary, giving speeches talking about a new Bretton Woods moment and a Bretton Woods realignment in

You can look at the papers and the work that people like Steve Moran have been doing, the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, which again predated the election. So these ideas are not purely being slapped on post hoc. They have been there for quite a while. Does it add up to a consistent game plan?

You can look at the papers and the work that people like Steve Moran have been doing, the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, which again predated the election. So these ideas are not purely being slapped on post hoc. They have been there for quite a while. Does it add up to a consistent game plan?

Categorically not, because right now, around Donald Trump, there are three potentially competing factions. Very roughly speaking, the national populists, headed by Steve Bannon and others, Peter Navarro and all of that group, the techno-libertarians, epitomized by Elon Musk, and then you have the parts of the congressional Republicans who are working with Trump to epitomized by Mike Johnson.

Categorically not, because right now, around Donald Trump, there are three potentially competing factions. Very roughly speaking, the national populists, headed by Steve Bannon and others, Peter Navarro and all of that group, the techno-libertarians, epitomized by Elon Musk, and then you have the parts of the congressional Republicans who are working with Trump to epitomized by Mike Johnson.

Factions which are doing battle with each other, sometimes deliberately whipped up by Trump himself, and that creates a sense of chaos. You've also got the fact that I don't think Donald Trump himself understands the overarching vision that clearly much of the time.

Factions which are doing battle with each other, sometimes deliberately whipped up by Trump himself, and that creates a sense of chaos. You've also got the fact that I don't think Donald Trump himself understands the overarching vision that clearly much of the time.

But at the same time, you can't lose sight of the fact that there are people who do want to re-engineer the global financial and economic system. And they do have quite a coherent plan in the sense that it does have a certain amount of internal logic. It absolutely might not make sense in terms of the economic worldview that's dominated in recent decades.

But at the same time, you can't lose sight of the fact that there are people who do want to re-engineer the global financial and economic system. And they do have quite a coherent plan in the sense that it does have a certain amount of internal logic. It absolutely might not make sense in terms of the economic worldview that's dominated in recent decades.

And many, if not most, mainstream economists might say that in fact elements of it are either crazy or doomed to fail. But there is certainly some element of a new framework.

And many, if not most, mainstream economists might say that in fact elements of it are either crazy or doomed to fail. But there is certainly some element of a new framework.

Well, first of all, it's a very dense paper, so this is not a quick one-pager tossed off one night at all, and goes back to the point about there being a current of intellectual rethinking that we should take seriously. The paper essentially argues that trade and financial flows are and military power are intimately connected. They need to be viewed as a whole.

Well, first of all, it's a very dense paper, so this is not a quick one-pager tossed off one night at all, and goes back to the point about there being a current of intellectual rethinking that we should take seriously. The paper essentially argues that trade and financial flows are and military power are intimately connected. They need to be viewed as a whole.

And it points to the fundamental contradiction between America having this dollar as a dominant global reserve currency, which tends to strengthen it, the contradiction that they're using tariffs as a tactical move, which tends to strengthen the dollar, And the fact that they also think that the dollar is too strong and they want to weaken it.

And it points to the fundamental contradiction between America having this dollar as a dominant global reserve currency, which tends to strengthen it, the contradiction that they're using tariffs as a tactical move, which tends to strengthen the dollar, And the fact that they also think that the dollar is too strong and they want to weaken it.

And so in order to try and square that seemingly impossible circle, he suggests essentially trying to remake the way that countries cooperate with each other around financial flows.

And so in order to try and square that seemingly impossible circle, he suggests essentially trying to remake the way that countries cooperate with each other around financial flows.

He's also echoing an idea which has been advanced by Scott Besant, which is that essentially you should go out and divide countries or ask countries how they want to divide themselves into red, yellow and green buckets. The red are the foes of America, the green are the friends of America and the yellow are the ones who are in some ways not aligned.

He's also echoing an idea which has been advanced by Scott Besant, which is that essentially you should go out and divide countries or ask countries how they want to divide themselves into red, yellow and green buckets. The red are the foes of America, the green are the friends of America and the yellow are the ones who are in some ways not aligned.

And essentially the green countries will come inside the system to cut deals and be free of tariffs and get military protection and be part of a Mar-a-Lago accord. The red countries won't. And the orange ones or the yellow ones are up for grabs and can do all kinds of transactional deals. So it's a vision very much based on hegemonic power of a thought that frankly we last saw in the 1930s.

And essentially the green countries will come inside the system to cut deals and be free of tariffs and get military protection and be part of a Mar-a-Lago accord. The red countries won't. And the orange ones or the yellow ones are up for grabs and can do all kinds of transactional deals. So it's a vision very much based on hegemonic power of a thought that frankly we last saw in the 1930s.

Well, it's a rough start in many ways. They would probably say it's a deliberately rough start. But to go back to Moran's paper, one of the most haunting parts of the paper is the fact he says it is indeed a very narrow path to walk through this to get to the supposed nirvana on the other side.

Well, it's a rough start in many ways. They would probably say it's a deliberately rough start. But to go back to Moran's paper, one of the most haunting parts of the paper is the fact he says it is indeed a very narrow path to walk through this to get to the supposed nirvana on the other side.

And, you know, he doesn't really address the question of what happens if they fail to go through that narrow path and simply blow up the economy and global financial system. But those risks are very apparent. And in terms of where they're going and implementing this vision, I can't stress strongly enough, we just don't know right now.

And, you know, he doesn't really address the question of what happens if they fail to go through that narrow path and simply blow up the economy and global financial system. But those risks are very apparent. And in terms of where they're going and implementing this vision, I can't stress strongly enough, we just don't know right now.

All we can do is watch what they're doing and recognize two potentially contradictory things. One is that it is chaotic because of these different factions, much as some people around him might like to think they have a grandiose plan, actually implementing it is not grandiose or seamless whatsoever. Trump is not a McKinsey consultant with a spreadsheet and PowerPoint charts at all.

All we can do is watch what they're doing and recognize two potentially contradictory things. One is that it is chaotic because of these different factions, much as some people around him might like to think they have a grandiose plan, actually implementing it is not grandiose or seamless whatsoever. Trump is not a McKinsey consultant with a spreadsheet and PowerPoint charts at all.

A lot of it is done on the fly. But secondly, that there is an economic vision here, which is radically different from what we're used to. But it's not the first time that we've had to face a big epistemological shift. If you think back over the last 200 years of economic history, you know, before World War I, if you like, we had basically imperial economics.

A lot of it is done on the fly. But secondly, that there is an economic vision here, which is radically different from what we're used to. But it's not the first time that we've had to face a big epistemological shift. If you think back over the last 200 years of economic history, you know, before World War I, if you like, we had basically imperial economics.

We then moved to the extreme protectionism between the two world wars. We then had the rise of Keynesianism, which took root. Then we had the rise of neoliberal economics. Now we're seeing something that in some ways is back to the future, going back to the type of mercantilism and hegemonic power structure. We don't know where it's going to go next.

We then moved to the extreme protectionism between the two world wars. We then had the rise of Keynesianism, which took root. Then we had the rise of neoliberal economics. Now we're seeing something that in some ways is back to the future, going back to the type of mercantilism and hegemonic power structure. We don't know where it's going to go next.

The one thing I'll say is that as someone who trained as a cultural anthropologist, one thing you learn is that every single person assumes that the intellectual framework they grew up with and built their careers around is natural, normal, inevitable, and should be universal. That's just the nature of being human. And everybody is wrong. Ideas change over time.

The one thing I'll say is that as someone who trained as a cultural anthropologist, one thing you learn is that every single person assumes that the intellectual framework they grew up with and built their careers around is natural, normal, inevitable, and should be universal. That's just the nature of being human. And everybody is wrong. Ideas change over time.

They go in fashions or cycles, however you want to frame it. And so I've seen it firsthand that intellectual frameworks can shift over time and collapse, and that we can't ever assume that the ideas we hold so dear because we grew up with them, because we're all creatures of our own intellectual environments, are going to be universal and permanent. Well, let me...

They go in fashions or cycles, however you want to frame it. And so I've seen it firsthand that intellectual frameworks can shift over time and collapse, and that we can't ever assume that the ideas we hold so dear because we grew up with them, because we're all creatures of our own intellectual environments, are going to be universal and permanent. Well, let me...