Frank Slootman

It was written by the same people that wrote the enterprise product. We tried to dumb it down. We did a terrible job of dumbing it down. We brought it to market. There was interest in it. We were selling it for $10,000 to $15,000 versus $50,000 at the entry price. Did a lot of transactions and made a lot of companies unhappy. Product wasn't easy to use. It became a burden for us on support.

It was written by the same people that wrote the enterprise product. We tried to dumb it down. We did a terrible job of dumbing it down. We brought it to market. There was interest in it. We were selling it for $10,000 to $15,000 versus $50,000 at the entry price. Did a lot of transactions and made a lot of companies unhappy. Product wasn't easy to use. It became a burden for us on support.

And quite honestly, we were an enterprise company trying to act like something else. And what I realized is there's 10 competitors down market. Let them go beat the crap out of each other down there. They'll drive all the investor dollars into the toilet. And we'll just sit here and focus on what we do really, really well and own the market that matters. And so that's what we did.

And quite honestly, we were an enterprise company trying to act like something else. And what I realized is there's 10 competitors down market. Let them go beat the crap out of each other down there. They'll drive all the investor dollars into the toilet. And we'll just sit here and focus on what we do really, really well and own the market that matters. And so that's what we did.

And quite honestly, we were an enterprise company trying to act like something else. And what I realized is there's 10 competitors down market. Let them go beat the crap out of each other down there. They'll drive all the investor dollars into the toilet. And we'll just sit here and focus on what we do really, really well and own the market that matters. And so that's what we did.

We exited a market. We made that mistake. How quickly was the mistake apparent? Probably in the six months. We just didn't want to hear it. How long did it take to make the decision? About a year and a half. I've had worse. Yeah. I mean, we are pretty ruthless about decisioning. And as I said, one of our strengths was make decisions quickly.

We exited a market. We made that mistake. How quickly was the mistake apparent? Probably in the six months. We just didn't want to hear it. How long did it take to make the decision? About a year and a half. I've had worse. Yeah. I mean, we are pretty ruthless about decisioning. And as I said, one of our strengths was make decisions quickly.

We exited a market. We made that mistake. How quickly was the mistake apparent? Probably in the six months. We just didn't want to hear it. How long did it take to make the decision? About a year and a half. I've had worse. Yeah. I mean, we are pretty ruthless about decisioning. And as I said, one of our strengths was make decisions quickly.

At the same time, we had to be bold enough to say some of the decisions I made of the journey aren't perfect.

At the same time, we had to be bold enough to say some of the decisions I made of the journey aren't perfect.

At the same time, we had to be bold enough to say some of the decisions I made of the journey aren't perfect.

What started happening at ServiceNow that we took advantage of was our customers started using our product in places it wasn't originally positioned for. Turns out that by 2015, we had hundreds of customers using us in new ways. And so what we started to do is just listen.

What started happening at ServiceNow that we took advantage of was our customers started using our product in places it wasn't originally positioned for. Turns out that by 2015, we had hundreds of customers using us in new ways. And so what we started to do is just listen.

What started happening at ServiceNow that we took advantage of was our customers started using our product in places it wasn't originally positioned for. Turns out that by 2015, we had hundreds of customers using us in new ways. And so what we started to do is just listen.

And then we productized what they did and built full-on customer service product, full-on security incident vulnerability products, full-on HR employee experience products. And because we just followed the customer, we had better success. That was not easy because we ended up creating business units.

And then we productized what they did and built full-on customer service product, full-on security incident vulnerability products, full-on HR employee experience products. And because we just followed the customer, we had better success. That was not easy because we ended up creating business units.

And then we productized what they did and built full-on customer service product, full-on security incident vulnerability products, full-on HR employee experience products. And because we just followed the customer, we had better success. That was not easy because we ended up creating business units.

I had to come up with a different selling model to sell new technology because the buying persona was outside of the core. I didn't do it until I was fairly penetrated and winning in ITSM. If I didn't feel like I was already winning there, and it was not a distraction, then I could do it.

I had to come up with a different selling model to sell new technology because the buying persona was outside of the core. I didn't do it until I was fairly penetrated and winning in ITSM. If I didn't feel like I was already winning there, and it was not a distraction, then I could do it.

I had to come up with a different selling model to sell new technology because the buying persona was outside of the core. I didn't do it until I was fairly penetrated and winning in ITSM. If I didn't feel like I was already winning there, and it was not a distraction, then I could do it.