Alexander Vindman

I don't think so. Not under the approach that the Trump administration is taking. It's an approach that looks to appease Russia in the tradition of 30 plus years of Russia first policy. And it's one where, frankly, Russia is not going to be satisfied with the level of appeasement that the Trump administration is offering because the Ukrainians are not willing to capitulate.

I don't think so. Not under the approach that the Trump administration is taking. It's an approach that looks to appease Russia in the tradition of 30 plus years of Russia first policy. And it's one where, frankly, Russia is not going to be satisfied with the level of appeasement that the Trump administration is offering because the Ukrainians are not willing to capitulate.

The prospects look dimmer now than they did before Trump took office.

The prospects look dimmer now than they did before Trump took office.

The prospects look dimmer now than they did before Trump took office.

I've always been focused on U.S. national security. If you paid attention to any of my testimony back then or any of the commentary, it's not been about Ukraine. It's not really even been about Trump. I have no warm feelings towards him because he's a danger, in my view, to the U.S. But it's more about the professionalism that I've tried to uphold as a career military officer, as a

I've always been focused on U.S. national security. If you paid attention to any of my testimony back then or any of the commentary, it's not been about Ukraine. It's not really even been about Trump. I have no warm feelings towards him because he's a danger, in my view, to the U.S. But it's more about the professionalism that I've tried to uphold as a career military officer, as a

I've always been focused on U.S. national security. If you paid attention to any of my testimony back then or any of the commentary, it's not been about Ukraine. It's not really even been about Trump. I have no warm feelings towards him because he's a danger, in my view, to the U.S. But it's more about the professionalism that I've tried to uphold as a career military officer, as a

Sure. We should be clear that it wasn't just getting Ukraine wrong. It was getting Russia wrong consistently. With regards to what we could have done to support Ukraine, there were a couple of moments that stand out. I think in the Orange Revolution in 2004, we did very, very kid-glove condemnations of Russia against We should have worn them off and invested in Ukraine, and we didn't do that.

Sure. We should be clear that it wasn't just getting Ukraine wrong. It was getting Russia wrong consistently. With regards to what we could have done to support Ukraine, there were a couple of moments that stand out. I think in the Orange Revolution in 2004, we did very, very kid-glove condemnations of Russia against We should have worn them off and invested in Ukraine, and we didn't do that.

Sure. We should be clear that it wasn't just getting Ukraine wrong. It was getting Russia wrong consistently. With regards to what we could have done to support Ukraine, there were a couple of moments that stand out. I think in the Orange Revolution in 2004, we did very, very kid-glove condemnations of Russia against We should have worn them off and invested in Ukraine, and we didn't do that.

There was another turning point in 2014 when it was clear that the Russians were graduating from hybrid warfare to outright military aggression. We could have not— Exactly right. We could have not done what we did, which was look to reset, but we could have avoided doing a reset and instead have been quite conditional in our relationship with Russia.

There was another turning point in 2014 when it was clear that the Russians were graduating from hybrid warfare to outright military aggression. We could have not— Exactly right. We could have not done what we did, which was look to reset, but we could have avoided doing a reset and instead have been quite conditional in our relationship with Russia.

There was another turning point in 2014 when it was clear that the Russians were graduating from hybrid warfare to outright military aggression. We could have not— Exactly right. We could have not done what we did, which was look to reset, but we could have avoided doing a reset and instead have been quite conditional in our relationship with Russia.

Condemnatory where we needed to be, imposing sanctions, helping arm Ukraine so it looks like a harder target. That was another critical turning point.

Condemnatory where we needed to be, imposing sanctions, helping arm Ukraine so it looks like a harder target. That was another critical turning point.

Condemnatory where we needed to be, imposing sanctions, helping arm Ukraine so it looks like a harder target. That was another critical turning point.

What we should be doing is understanding that we could focus on long-term objectives. We could be focusing on making sure we have strong alliances with NATO, that our support for that collective defense treaty is ironclad. We should be investing in places like Ukraine or Taiwan, other places around the world that look like they could be the targets for the aggression of our adversaries.

What we should be doing is understanding that we could focus on long-term objectives. We could be focusing on making sure we have strong alliances with NATO, that our support for that collective defense treaty is ironclad. We should be investing in places like Ukraine or Taiwan, other places around the world that look like they could be the targets for the aggression of our adversaries.

What we should be doing is understanding that we could focus on long-term objectives. We could be focusing on making sure we have strong alliances with NATO, that our support for that collective defense treaty is ironclad. We should be investing in places like Ukraine or Taiwan, other places around the world that look like they could be the targets for the aggression of our adversaries.