Ambassador John Negroponte

Das war also der Anfang des Errichtens eines großen Nordvietnames, der im Süden war. Am Ende des Krieges, 1975, gab es etwa 14 Divisionen. von Nord-Vietnamiens Truppen in Süd-Vietnamiens. Also, was als Guerilla-Wahl beginnt, endet wirklich als konventionelles militärisches Verletzen von Saigon durch die Nord-Vietnamiens-Armee.

Das war also der Anfang des Errichtens eines großen Nordvietnames, der im Süden war. Am Ende des Krieges, 1975, gab es etwa 14 Divisionen. von Nord-Vietnamiens Truppen in Süd-Vietnamiens. Also, was als Guerilla-Wahl beginnt, endet wirklich als konventionelles militärisches Verletzen von Saigon durch die Nord-Vietnamiens-Armee.

Also, diese Dinge darüber, dass es eine Guerilla-Wahl war, ja, es war während einer bestimmten Phase, aber im Grunde genommen waren die Nord-Vietnamiens bereit, das, was sie hatten, in es zu werfen, Achieve their ultimate objective, which was the reunification of the country.

Also, diese Dinge darüber, dass es eine Guerilla-Wahl war, ja, es war während einer bestimmten Phase, aber im Grunde genommen waren die Nord-Vietnamiens bereit, das, was sie hatten, in es zu werfen, Achieve their ultimate objective, which was the reunification of the country.

No, it was seen as part of the Cold War. It was a regional conflict in a Cold War context. And just like in Korea, where there had been a dividing line between North and South Korea, and we came to South Korea's defense, I think we saw it as a way of dealing with a form of North Vietnamese aggression.

No, it was seen as part of the Cold War. It was a regional conflict in a Cold War context. And just like in Korea, where there had been a dividing line between North and South Korea, and we came to South Korea's defense, I think we saw it as a way of dealing with a form of North Vietnamese aggression.

It got all bollocked up in the kind of politics and psychology that the two of you were discussing earlier. Aber ich meine, ich denke, wir sahen es als eine ziemlich straightforward Situation. Die Leute, für die ich gearbeitet habe, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ellsworth Bunker, William Westmoreland, der General, der Kommandanten-General, sie waren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren wach.

It got all bollocked up in the kind of politics and psychology that the two of you were discussing earlier. Aber ich meine, ich denke, wir sahen es als eine ziemlich straightforward Situation. Die Leute, für die ich gearbeitet habe, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ellsworth Bunker, William Westmoreland, der General, der Kommandanten-General, sie waren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren wach.

They saw this as sort of like a Munich, like a Hitlerian, you know, they're responding to... No appeasement.

They saw this as sort of like a Munich, like a Hitlerian, you know, they're responding to... No appeasement.

Everybody is always fighting the last war. I mean, that's the way wars go. I think you guys overplay in your discussion... the lasting impact of Vietnam. Because I think we finally got, we had what we called the Vietnam Syndrome. And for a number of years after that, and I went on to many different jobs. In fact, I was Henry Kissinger's director for Vietnam when he negotiated the peace agreement.

Everybody is always fighting the last war. I mean, that's the way wars go. I think you guys overplay in your discussion... the lasting impact of Vietnam. Because I think we finally got, we had what we called the Vietnam Syndrome. And for a number of years after that, and I went on to many different jobs. In fact, I was Henry Kissinger's director for Vietnam when he negotiated the peace agreement.

And I was with Bush and Reagan and Bush later on. We sort of finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome. I would say when Bush decided to, you know, Panamá zu zerstören und Noriega zu ersetzen, Noriega zu ersetzen. Und dann ging er in die erste Irakische Krieg, die Kuwaitische Krieg.

And I was with Bush and Reagan and Bush later on. We sort of finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome. I would say when Bush decided to, you know, Panamá zu zerstören und Noriega zu ersetzen, Noriega zu ersetzen. Und dann ging er in die erste Irakische Krieg, die Kuwaitische Krieg.

Und an diesem Punkt, glaube ich, haben wir endlich zumindest den Aspekt des Vietnames-Syndroms übernommen, der sagte, sende nicht die US-Mitglieder.

Und an diesem Punkt, glaube ich, haben wir endlich zumindest den Aspekt des Vietnames-Syndroms übernommen, der sagte, sende nicht die US-Mitglieder.

Ich hatte viel damit zu tun. Ich war in der UN, als wir Resolutionen verabschiedeten. Do you accept that premise? I think partially. But I want to identify another trend for you, which I don't know whether you've considered. What is it about these conflicts that we get into them?

Ich hatte viel damit zu tun. Ich war in der UN, als wir Resolutionen verabschiedeten. Do you accept that premise? I think partially. But I want to identify another trend for you, which I don't know whether you've considered. What is it about these conflicts that we get into them?

And then after having trained a whole generation of people to fight the war, to learn the reason why, to be committed to the policy, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now potentially Ukraine.

And then after having trained a whole generation of people to fight the war, to learn the reason why, to be committed to the policy, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now potentially Ukraine.

I know. But what is it about this propensity that we have to get into these conflicts, but not be able to think it far enough through to assure our own selves that we're really going to stay the course? What kind of friend are you or an ally or a supporter of somebody if halfway through the deal, You decide to pull the plug.

I know. But what is it about this propensity that we have to get into these conflicts, but not be able to think it far enough through to assure our own selves that we're really going to stay the course? What kind of friend are you or an ally or a supporter of somebody if halfway through the deal, You decide to pull the plug.

I'm not denying the social consequences that Vietnam had on people here in this country. But, you know, in terms of what we did to them, by the time the peace talks were over in 1972 and early 73, our exposure in Vietnam was very limited. We had 50,000 troops, not 500,000. And they were relegated entirely to support functions.

I'm not denying the social consequences that Vietnam had on people here in this country. But, you know, in terms of what we did to them, by the time the peace talks were over in 1972 and early 73, our exposure in Vietnam was very limited. We had 50,000 troops, not 500,000. And they were relegated entirely to support functions.

But yeah, but I mean, that's the truth in Vietnam back in 73. And yet, I mean, I was Kissinger's man on Vietnam at that time, you know. They just didn't want to go into the second administration. They didn't want to go into the second administration, the second term, as Henry used to say, reading battlefield reports for breakfast every morning. They just didn't want it. I mean, Nixon was tired.

But yeah, but I mean, that's the truth in Vietnam back in 73. And yet, I mean, I was Kissinger's man on Vietnam at that time, you know. They just didn't want to go into the second administration. They didn't want to go into the second administration, the second term, as Henry used to say, reading battlefield reports for breakfast every morning. They just didn't want it. I mean, Nixon was tired.

I heard him say it to Joe and Lai. We went out to see Joe and Lai in June and Mao Zedong with Brezhnev a month earlier. And it was exactly that. Henry said, we don't want to be leading battlefield reports.

I heard him say it to Joe and Lai. We went out to see Joe and Lai in June and Mao Zedong with Brezhnev a month earlier. And it was exactly that. Henry said, we don't want to be leading battlefield reports.

Correct, and he was older.

Correct, and he was older.

That's a good point. That's a great point. And we had in Saigon, and we had great press people there. I'm talking about both the correspondents. You know, when you're a young officer, In the State Department. You befriend the press much more easily.

That's a good point. That's a great point. And we had in Saigon, and we had great press people there. I'm talking about both the correspondents. You know, when you're a young officer, In the State Department. You befriend the press much more easily.

And you're all the same age. So we knew these guys really well. You know, the Johnny Apples of this world. And Ward Just and so forth. But we have the five o'clock follies. That's what we called it. The five o'clock press conference every day. I used to say to myself exactly what you said. I said, what are we doing? Spoon feeding these people.

And you're all the same age. So we knew these guys really well. You know, the Johnny Apples of this world. And Ward Just and so forth. But we have the five o'clock follies. That's what we called it. The five o'clock press conference every day. I used to say to myself exactly what you said. I said, what are we doing? Spoon feeding these people.

And if I remember correctly, at the beginning, you had to fly the tape back to the United States, right? Before you could broadcast. But I think by the end, that was no longer the case.

And if I remember correctly, at the beginning, you had to fly the tape back to the United States, right? Before you could broadcast. But I think by the end, that was no longer the case.

Tom, ich denke, dass die Probleme sind, wenn man einen dieser Verbrechen oder was auch immer, It sort of mushrooms into being the whole story. And it's not the whole story, I promise you.

Tom, ich denke, dass die Probleme sind, wenn man einen dieser Verbrechen oder was auch immer, It sort of mushrooms into being the whole story. And it's not the whole story, I promise you.

Especially if it's well documented. Absolutely. So what are you doing in Iraq? You're embedding these people in the units. It's like having a body camera on you while you're in combat, right? They see everything you do.

Especially if it's well documented. Absolutely. So what are you doing in Iraq? You're embedding these people in the units. It's like having a body camera on you while you're in combat, right? They see everything you do.

Yeah, and when you're trying to put, here's the issue, trying to put incident X into the context or perspective of the entire conflict. And, you know, then you get into fairly subjective judgments, I agree. But, you know, you still have to make the judgment as to whether or not it's the right thing for us to be in that conflict.

Yeah, and when you're trying to put, here's the issue, trying to put incident X into the context or perspective of the entire conflict. And, you know, then you get into fairly subjective judgments, I agree. But, you know, you still have to make the judgment as to whether or not it's the right thing for us to be in that conflict.

Well, maybe it tells you that these regional conflicts were not as important as we thought they were. You could make that argument, I guess. In other words, it may not have had much to do with the downfall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Afghanistan did have something to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, because The Soviets were sick and tired of their occupation of Afghanistan.

Well, maybe it tells you that these regional conflicts were not as important as we thought they were. You could make that argument, I guess. In other words, it may not have had much to do with the downfall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Afghanistan did have something to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, because The Soviets were sick and tired of their occupation of Afghanistan.

And they came to us in the late 1980s. I was on the National Security Council with Colin Powell. And they came to us and said, we want to discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I, being a hardcore Cold Warrior at the time, said, Colin, don't believe them. That's a trick. It's a trick. And his answer to me was really good. He said,

And they came to us in the late 1980s. I was on the National Security Council with Colin Powell. And they came to us and said, we want to discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I, being a hardcore Cold Warrior at the time, said, Colin, don't believe them. That's a trick. It's a trick. And his answer to me was really good. He said,

You know, John, if you had as many beers as I've had with Soviet generals and Soviet admirals, you would know they want to get the hell out of there.

You know, John, if you had as many beers as I've had with Soviet generals and Soviet admirals, you would know they want to get the hell out of there.

Well, I mean, I'm sorry we lost Vietnam, frankly. I'm not in the school that thinks it was a travesty, nor do I think it was a great human rights situation. Because I knew all those government officials who ran down to the village and province level. I knew them all because of my experience as a provincial reporter.

Well, I mean, I'm sorry we lost Vietnam, frankly. I'm not in the school that thinks it was a travesty, nor do I think it was a great human rights situation. Because I knew all those government officials who ran down to the village and province level. I knew them all because of my experience as a provincial reporter.

A loss of political will. I think that we got to the point in... The fall of 1972, where if we had wanted to maintain a residual presence in South Vietnam with, let's say, 25,000 troops and continued air support and some continued economic assistance, we might have been able to pull that off. But I'm the first to admit that the political atmosphere had become poisonous, right?

A loss of political will. I think that we got to the point in... The fall of 1972, where if we had wanted to maintain a residual presence in South Vietnam with, let's say, 25,000 troops and continued air support and some continued economic assistance, we might have been able to pull that off. But I'm the first to admit that the political atmosphere had become poisonous, right?

I mean, it was just, it just became too hard. We'd spent our political capital with most, with many of the American people and certainly with the Congress.

I mean, it was just, it just became too hard. We'd spent our political capital with most, with many of the American people and certainly with the Congress.

But also that if Vietnam fell, there was the danger that then the Vietnamese might go on to other parts of Southeast Asia, which they in fact did not do.

But also that if Vietnam fell, there was the danger that then the Vietnamese might go on to other parts of Southeast Asia, which they in fact did not do.

You know why these guys did that? I mean, I'm pretty certain. dass die Aufnahmen im System installiert wurden, weil Both Kissinger and Nixon thought it would help them better sell their books after their term of office. I'm not kidding you.

You know why these guys did that? I mean, I'm pretty certain. dass die Aufnahmen im System installiert wurden, weil Both Kissinger and Nixon thought it would help them better sell their books after their term of office. I'm not kidding you.

I mean, I think Luke Nixter, who you've probably read, he did the book on the Nixon tapes. Das ist ein exzellentes Buch. Es ist ein sehr beobachtungsvolles Gespräch.

I mean, I think Luke Nixter, who you've probably read, he did the book on the Nixon tapes. Das ist ein exzellentes Buch. Es ist ein sehr beobachtungsvolles Gespräch.

But there are other lessons. Let me just say this. You know, that's one angle, and particularly the impact on the psyche of the American people and American politics. But there's another aspect to this, which I think is very important. And I've happened to have been involved in about three or four of these conflicts. So I have a basis for comparison.

But there are other lessons. Let me just say this. You know, that's one angle, and particularly the impact on the psyche of the American people and American politics. But there's another aspect to this, which I think is very important. And I've happened to have been involved in about three or four of these conflicts. So I have a basis for comparison.

There's also the issue of how we fought the war. And I think it's important. First of all, the draft was very unjust. And you got to acknowledge that That contributed to a lot of bitterness about the way the war was managed. Because if you had access to get out, you got out. Right. We all got deferments, right. Second, so Creighton Abrams, you know, LBJ thought about choosing him in 64.

There's also the issue of how we fought the war. And I think it's important. First of all, the draft was very unjust. And you got to acknowledge that That contributed to a lot of bitterness about the way the war was managed. Because if you had access to get out, you got out. Right. We all got deferments, right. Second, so Creighton Abrams, you know, LBJ thought about choosing him in 64.

If he'd chosen Abrams instead of Westmoreland, We might have ended up in much less of a pickle. But Westy just kept on asking for more and more troops. Even after the Tet Offensive, when the Viet Cong were practically decimated, he goes and asks for 206,000 more troops. I've always put forward the hypothetical. What if instead Westy had written the cable saying, Mr. President...

If he'd chosen Abrams instead of Westmoreland, We might have ended up in much less of a pickle. But Westy just kept on asking for more and more troops. Even after the Tet Offensive, when the Viet Cong were practically decimated, he goes and asks for 206,000 more troops. I've always put forward the hypothetical. What if instead Westy had written the cable saying, Mr. President...

The Vietcong have suffered a terrible defeat. You can now safely withdraw 200,000 troops. It might have turned around the psychology completely. I did a review of it when I first got there. Colin Powell, who was Secretary of State, asked me to do the review. And I pointed out to Washington that there was no money in there for building up the security forces. of Iraq.

The Vietcong have suffered a terrible defeat. You can now safely withdraw 200,000 troops. It might have turned around the psychology completely. I did a review of it when I first got there. Colin Powell, who was Secretary of State, asked me to do the review. And I pointed out to Washington that there was no money in there for building up the security forces. of Iraq.

And I recommended reprogramming $2 billion, count them, $2 billion from that 17 to training and equipping Iraqi forces. And Washington accepted my recommendation. So, I mean, I at least applied a lesson I felt I had learned. And General Casey, who was the commanding general, we worked very closely together. And We got that done.

And I recommended reprogramming $2 billion, count them, $2 billion from that 17 to training and equipping Iraqi forces. And Washington accepted my recommendation. So, I mean, I at least applied a lesson I felt I had learned. And General Casey, who was the commanding general, we worked very closely together. And We got that done.

And actually, Iraq is still, it hasn't gone down the tubes, by the way. Even though people don't like what we did in Iraq, I understand that. And it was a very, very debatable decision by President Bush, but it has not ended up in Iraq going down the drain.

And actually, Iraq is still, it hasn't gone down the tubes, by the way. Even though people don't like what we did in Iraq, I understand that. And it was a very, very debatable decision by President Bush, but it has not ended up in Iraq going down the drain.

There's some danger still in that regard. But no, I think we're a little better off than that. Anyway, how you fight these wars is another issue. I'm not saying it's the primary issue, but you can learn lessons there too.

There's some danger still in that regard. But no, I think we're a little better off than that. Anyway, how you fight these wars is another issue. I'm not saying it's the primary issue, but you can learn lessons there too.

I haven't really thought of it. I really haven't. Brian, what's your dealing? I mean, one of you was talking about your migration from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Mine was after Jimmy Carter, the failure of With regard to Iran and the fact that we were humiliated by having these hostages held for almost a year, whatever length of period it was, a year and a couple of months.

I haven't really thought of it. I really haven't. Brian, what's your dealing? I mean, one of you was talking about your migration from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Mine was after Jimmy Carter, the failure of With regard to Iran and the fact that we were humiliated by having these hostages held for almost a year, whatever length of period it was, a year and a couple of months.

And that's why I voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and then remained a Republican. After that. Oriented after that, although I honestly believe Maybe naively, that politics should stop at the water's edge.

And that's why I voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and then remained a Republican. After that. Oriented after that, although I honestly believe Maybe naively, that politics should stop at the water's edge.

going to Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff. And one time, I think in 1971 or so, I went with General Haig, who was Kissinger's deputy at the time, to Vietnam. And I visited one of our hospitals, field hospitals. And the doctor sat me down and told me about the levels of drug addiction of our troops. Und dass einige Leute so viele Vialen von Heroin pro Tag benutzen.

going to Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff. And one time, I think in 1971 or so, I went with General Haig, who was Kissinger's deputy at the time, to Vietnam. And I visited one of our hospitals, field hospitals. And the doctor sat me down and told me about the levels of drug addiction of our troops. Und dass einige Leute so viele Vialen von Heroin pro Tag benutzen.

Ich meine, es war eine Horror-Szene. Und das, glaube ich, war nicht der Fall am Anfang unserer Einwanderung. Aber irgendwie kamen Drogen in diese ganze Bildung. Und ich denke, das passiert auch den Russen in Afghanistan.

Ich meine, es war eine Horror-Szene. Und das, glaube ich, war nicht der Fall am Anfang unserer Einwanderung. Aber irgendwie kamen Drogen in diese ganze Bildung. Und ich denke, das passiert auch den Russen in Afghanistan.

Es war ein großes Problem. Es war ein großes Problem. And you remember the army finally cleaned it up, but by cracking down very hard, but only after we got out of Vietnam.

Es war ein großes Problem. Es war ein großes Problem. And you remember the army finally cleaned it up, but by cracking down very hard, but only after we got out of Vietnam.

Ich versuche, das zu verstehen. How do you explain that this happened to the Vietnam vets, but less so to the other ones who came back, like the ones who came back from Iraq?

Ich versuche, das zu verstehen. How do you explain that this happened to the Vietnam vets, but less so to the other ones who came back, like the ones who came back from Iraq?

I just think we're more aware. No, we have them, but we treat them more respectfully. I mean, I think the Vietnam vets felt they were not treated with respect.

I just think we're more aware. No, we have them, but we treat them more respectfully. I mean, I think the Vietnam vets felt they were not treated with respect.

So that's one of the lessons we learned.

So that's one of the lessons we learned.

Yeah, I think that's maybe true. Well, and we don't do drugs very well anyway, right? We don't deal with the addiction issues in our society very well.

Yeah, I think that's maybe true. Well, and we don't do drugs very well anyway, right? We don't deal with the addiction issues in our society very well.

No, I've not seen it, but I just made a note of it.

No, I've not seen it, but I just made a note of it.

Because they left North Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements of 1954. There was a transfer of a million people to the South. And then many of those same people then, or their descendants, came to the United States. But I'll give John McCain and others great credit Despite having fought the war, despite having been... Actually, there were a couple of the prisoners of war.

Because they left North Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements of 1954. There was a transfer of a million people to the South. And then many of those same people then, or their descendants, came to the United States. But I'll give John McCain and others great credit Despite having fought the war, despite having been... Actually, there were a couple of the prisoners of war.

McCain and the fellow also who was the first ambassador to Vietnam, to the unified Vietnam. They wanted to reopen relations. They didn't want to keep the grudge forever. And I think they're right. You know, when a war is over, it's over. You got to... You gotta try to rebuild a relationship of some kind. And I think we've done a pretty good job of that with today's Vietnam.

McCain and the fellow also who was the first ambassador to Vietnam, to the unified Vietnam. They wanted to reopen relations. They didn't want to keep the grudge forever. And I think they're right. You know, when a war is over, it's over. You got to... You gotta try to rebuild a relationship of some kind. And I think we've done a pretty good job of that with today's Vietnam.

Even though we don't agree with all of their politics, right? I mean, I think it's... And I think John McCain and others who advocated for the relationship deserve our gratitude for having done that. Because, you know, we could have kept the grudge for even longer. And that would not have been good.

Even though we don't agree with all of their politics, right? I mean, I think it's... And I think John McCain and others who advocated for the relationship deserve our gratitude for having done that. Because, you know, we could have kept the grudge for even longer. And that would not have been good.

I think you're right. Most of my career, which ended up being 44 years, but in the early part of my career, when I always went up to Capitol Hill a lot from the State Department. In the beginning, you could count on these World War II veterans to carry forward our national security.

I think you're right. Most of my career, which ended up being 44 years, but in the early part of my career, when I always went up to Capitol Hill a lot from the State Department. In the beginning, you could count on these World War II veterans to carry forward our national security.

There you go.

There you go.

Yep, yep. And that's a big loss. I think you're right about Iraq, although I don't know if there are enough of them.

Yep, yep. And that's a big loss. I think you're right about Iraq, although I don't know if there are enough of them.

I would add one thing. I saw it in Iraq. I saw it myself with my own eyes. The competence of our military, they have become so proficient in what they do. I mean, I think of them as a class of people amongst the best educated people in our country.

I would add one thing. I saw it in Iraq. I saw it myself with my own eyes. The competence of our military, they have become so proficient in what they do. I mean, I think of them as a class of people amongst the best educated people in our country.

Gentlemen, when I was in Vietnam, we used to talk all night about the war. But are we going to talk? How much longer are we going to talk?

Gentlemen, when I was in Vietnam, we used to talk all night about the war. But are we going to talk? How much longer are we going to talk?

This is fun.

This is fun.

I would say they're very similar in the sense that we kind of just got tired of each of these conflicts and couldn't figure out a sustainable way to leave those two countries. And I think there was a sustainable way that would have not involved great cost for the United States, but might have prevented a lot of misery.

I would say they're very similar in the sense that we kind of just got tired of each of these conflicts and couldn't figure out a sustainable way to leave those two countries. And I think there was a sustainable way that would have not involved great cost for the United States, but might have prevented a lot of misery.

It's a little bit like the famous joke of Kissinger asking Zhou Enlai, the Prime Minister of China, what he thought of the French... Revolution, and Joe and I responded, it's too soon to tell. It's a great one.

It's a little bit like the famous joke of Kissinger asking Zhou Enlai, the Prime Minister of China, what he thought of the French... Revolution, and Joe and I responded, it's too soon to tell. It's a great one.

Well, I enjoyed listening and talking to both of you.

Well, I enjoyed listening and talking to both of you.

Thank you very much. Really appreciate it. Thanks to both of you.

Thank you very much. Really appreciate it. Thanks to both of you.

Yeah, first let me just say, just a small correction. Chuck, you said I'd been ambassador to Vietnam. I've been an ambassador five times, but not to Vietnam. I got there when I was 24 years old. When I got there in 1964, after studying Vietnamese in Washington for a number of months, we had about 20,000

Yeah, first let me just say, just a small correction. Chuck, you said I'd been ambassador to Vietnam. I've been an ambassador five times, but not to Vietnam. I got there when I was 24 years old. When I got there in 1964, after studying Vietnamese in Washington for a number of months, we had about 20,000

trainers there no people who were designated as combat troops let me back you up a match you were doing a quick language school where were you working and what was the what did you think your mission was that you had to take well i was a career foreign service officer and i had okay started my career in 1960, the fall of 1960. I'd had an assignment to Hong Kong. I went back to Washington.

trainers there no people who were designated as combat troops let me back you up a match you were doing a quick language school where were you working and what was the what did you think your mission was that you had to take well i was a career foreign service officer and i had okay started my career in 1960, the fall of 1960. I'd had an assignment to Hong Kong. I went back to Washington.

And they soon, because things were hotting up in Vietnam, asked me to take a 44-week, it wasn't so short, 44-week language training course. I went out there to the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon as a so-called provincial reporter. And I did a lot Things like what a journalist would do. I was assigned to cover six different provinces in South Vietnam.

And they soon, because things were hotting up in Vietnam, asked me to take a 44-week, it wasn't so short, 44-week language training course. I went out there to the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon as a so-called provincial reporter. And I did a lot Things like what a journalist would do. I was assigned to cover six different provinces in South Vietnam.

There was 42 of them in all, six or seven. I would go out every week. I'd collect information on the economic, political, diplomatic, security, military, etc. situation in the field. Then I'd come back. Die nächste Woche schreibe ich meine Berichte, mache meine Arbeiten und all das. Wir hatten kein Internet und all das, du weißt das. Wir hatten auch keine guten Telefonnummern.

There was 42 of them in all, six or seven. I would go out every week. I'd collect information on the economic, political, diplomatic, security, military, etc. situation in the field. Then I'd come back. Die nächste Woche schreibe ich meine Berichte, mache meine Arbeiten und all das. Wir hatten kein Internet und all das, du weißt das. Wir hatten auch keine guten Telefonnummern.

Also musste man eigentlich physisch zurück zur Ambasie kommen und Telegramme und so weiter schreiben. Das ist es, worauf ich gekommen bin. Die Nordvietnamiens hatten noch nicht angefangen, normale Nordvietnamiens-Armee-Truppen zu senden. into South Vietnam.

Also musste man eigentlich physisch zurück zur Ambasie kommen und Telegramme und so weiter schreiben. Das ist es, worauf ich gekommen bin. Die Nordvietnamiens hatten noch nicht angefangen, normale Nordvietnamiens-Armee-Truppen zu senden. into South Vietnam.

I got there in May of 64, the first time we detected North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam as part of their decision to escalate the situation in the South. Their tactics so far had not succeeded in causing South Vietnam to fall into their communist hands. So they decided to send their army and we captured a couple of their people. We are the South Vietnamese military, actually. im Juni 1964.

I got there in May of 64, the first time we detected North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam as part of their decision to escalate the situation in the South. Their tactics so far had not succeeded in causing South Vietnam to fall into their communist hands. So they decided to send their army and we captured a couple of their people. We are the South Vietnamese military, actually. im Juni 1964.

Das war also der Anfang des Errichtens eines großen Nordvietnames, der im Süden war. Am Ende des Krieges, 1975, gab es etwa 14 Divisionen. von Nord-Vietnamiens Truppen in Süd-Vietnamiens. Also, was als Guerilla-Wahl beginnt, endet wirklich als konventionelles militärisches Verletzen von Saigon durch die Nord-Vietnamiens-Armee.

Also, diese Dinge darüber, dass es eine Guerilla-Wahl war, ja, es war während einer bestimmten Phase, aber im Grunde genommen waren die Nord-Vietnamiens bereit, das, was sie hatten, in es zu werfen, Achieve their ultimate objective, which was the reunification of the country.

No, it was seen as part of the Cold War. It was a regional conflict in a Cold War context. And just like in Korea, where there had been a dividing line between North and South Korea, and we came to South Korea's defense, I think we saw it as a way of dealing with a form of North Vietnamese aggression.

It got all bollocked up in the kind of politics and psychology that the two of you were discussing earlier. Aber ich meine, ich denke, wir sahen es als eine ziemlich straightforward Situation. Die Leute, für die ich gearbeitet habe, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ellsworth Bunker, William Westmoreland, der General, der Kommandanten-General, sie waren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren wach.

They saw this as sort of like a Munich, like a Hitlerian, you know, they're responding to... No appeasement.

Everybody is always fighting the last war. I mean, that's the way wars go. I think you guys overplay in your discussion... the lasting impact of Vietnam. Because I think we finally got, we had what we called the Vietnam Syndrome. And for a number of years after that, and I went on to many different jobs. In fact, I was Henry Kissinger's director for Vietnam when he negotiated the peace agreement.

And I was with Bush and Reagan and Bush later on. We sort of finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome. I would say when Bush decided to, you know, Panamá zu zerstören und Noriega zu ersetzen, Noriega zu ersetzen. Und dann ging er in die erste Irakische Krieg, die Kuwaitische Krieg.

Und an diesem Punkt, glaube ich, haben wir endlich zumindest den Aspekt des Vietnames-Syndroms übernommen, der sagte, sende nicht die US-Mitglieder.

Ich hatte viel damit zu tun. Ich war in der UN, als wir Resolutionen verabschiedeten. Do you accept that premise? I think partially. But I want to identify another trend for you, which I don't know whether you've considered. What is it about these conflicts that we get into them?

And then after having trained a whole generation of people to fight the war, to learn the reason why, to be committed to the policy, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now potentially Ukraine.

I know. But what is it about this propensity that we have to get into these conflicts, but not be able to think it far enough through to assure our own selves that we're really going to stay the course? What kind of friend are you or an ally or a supporter of somebody if halfway through the deal, You decide to pull the plug.

I'm not denying the social consequences that Vietnam had on people here in this country. But, you know, in terms of what we did to them, by the time the peace talks were over in 1972 and early 73, our exposure in Vietnam was very limited. We had 50,000 troops, not 500,000. And they were relegated entirely to support functions.

But yeah, but I mean, that's the truth in Vietnam back in 73. And yet, I mean, I was Kissinger's man on Vietnam at that time, you know. They just didn't want to go into the second administration. They didn't want to go into the second administration, the second term, as Henry used to say, reading battlefield reports for breakfast every morning. They just didn't want it. I mean, Nixon was tired.

I heard him say it to Joe and Lai. We went out to see Joe and Lai in June and Mao Zedong with Brezhnev a month earlier. And it was exactly that. Henry said, we don't want to be leading battlefield reports.

Correct, and he was older.

That's a good point. That's a great point. And we had in Saigon, and we had great press people there. I'm talking about both the correspondents. You know, when you're a young officer, In the State Department. You befriend the press much more easily.

And you're all the same age. So we knew these guys really well. You know, the Johnny Apples of this world. And Ward Just and so forth. But we have the five o'clock follies. That's what we called it. The five o'clock press conference every day. I used to say to myself exactly what you said. I said, what are we doing? Spoon feeding these people.

And if I remember correctly, at the beginning, you had to fly the tape back to the United States, right? Before you could broadcast. But I think by the end, that was no longer the case.

Tom, ich denke, dass die Probleme sind, wenn man einen dieser Verbrechen oder was auch immer, It sort of mushrooms into being the whole story. And it's not the whole story, I promise you.

Especially if it's well documented. Absolutely. So what are you doing in Iraq? You're embedding these people in the units. It's like having a body camera on you while you're in combat, right? They see everything you do.

Yeah, and when you're trying to put, here's the issue, trying to put incident X into the context or perspective of the entire conflict. And, you know, then you get into fairly subjective judgments, I agree. But, you know, you still have to make the judgment as to whether or not it's the right thing for us to be in that conflict.

Well, maybe it tells you that these regional conflicts were not as important as we thought they were. You could make that argument, I guess. In other words, it may not have had much to do with the downfall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Afghanistan did have something to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, because The Soviets were sick and tired of their occupation of Afghanistan.

And they came to us in the late 1980s. I was on the National Security Council with Colin Powell. And they came to us and said, we want to discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I, being a hardcore Cold Warrior at the time, said, Colin, don't believe them. That's a trick. It's a trick. And his answer to me was really good. He said,

You know, John, if you had as many beers as I've had with Soviet generals and Soviet admirals, you would know they want to get the hell out of there.

Well, I mean, I'm sorry we lost Vietnam, frankly. I'm not in the school that thinks it was a travesty, nor do I think it was a great human rights situation. Because I knew all those government officials who ran down to the village and province level. I knew them all because of my experience as a provincial reporter.

A loss of political will. I think that we got to the point in... The fall of 1972, where if we had wanted to maintain a residual presence in South Vietnam with, let's say, 25,000 troops and continued air support and some continued economic assistance, we might have been able to pull that off. But I'm the first to admit that the political atmosphere had become poisonous, right?

I mean, it was just, it just became too hard. We'd spent our political capital with most, with many of the American people and certainly with the Congress.

But also that if Vietnam fell, there was the danger that then the Vietnamese might go on to other parts of Southeast Asia, which they in fact did not do.

You know why these guys did that? I mean, I'm pretty certain. dass die Aufnahmen im System installiert wurden, weil Both Kissinger and Nixon thought it would help them better sell their books after their term of office. I'm not kidding you.

I mean, I think Luke Nixter, who you've probably read, he did the book on the Nixon tapes. Das ist ein exzellentes Buch. Es ist ein sehr beobachtungsvolles Gespräch.

But there are other lessons. Let me just say this. You know, that's one angle, and particularly the impact on the psyche of the American people and American politics. But there's another aspect to this, which I think is very important. And I've happened to have been involved in about three or four of these conflicts. So I have a basis for comparison.

There's also the issue of how we fought the war. And I think it's important. First of all, the draft was very unjust. And you got to acknowledge that That contributed to a lot of bitterness about the way the war was managed. Because if you had access to get out, you got out. Right. We all got deferments, right. Second, so Creighton Abrams, you know, LBJ thought about choosing him in 64.

If he'd chosen Abrams instead of Westmoreland, We might have ended up in much less of a pickle. But Westy just kept on asking for more and more troops. Even after the Tet Offensive, when the Viet Cong were practically decimated, he goes and asks for 206,000 more troops. I've always put forward the hypothetical. What if instead Westy had written the cable saying, Mr. President...

The Vietcong have suffered a terrible defeat. You can now safely withdraw 200,000 troops. It might have turned around the psychology completely. I did a review of it when I first got there. Colin Powell, who was Secretary of State, asked me to do the review. And I pointed out to Washington that there was no money in there for building up the security forces. of Iraq.

And I recommended reprogramming $2 billion, count them, $2 billion from that 17 to training and equipping Iraqi forces. And Washington accepted my recommendation. So, I mean, I at least applied a lesson I felt I had learned. And General Casey, who was the commanding general, we worked very closely together. And We got that done.

And actually, Iraq is still, it hasn't gone down the tubes, by the way. Even though people don't like what we did in Iraq, I understand that. And it was a very, very debatable decision by President Bush, but it has not ended up in Iraq going down the drain.

There's some danger still in that regard. But no, I think we're a little better off than that. Anyway, how you fight these wars is another issue. I'm not saying it's the primary issue, but you can learn lessons there too.

I haven't really thought of it. I really haven't. Brian, what's your dealing? I mean, one of you was talking about your migration from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Mine was after Jimmy Carter, the failure of With regard to Iran and the fact that we were humiliated by having these hostages held for almost a year, whatever length of period it was, a year and a couple of months.

And that's why I voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and then remained a Republican. After that. Oriented after that, although I honestly believe Maybe naively, that politics should stop at the water's edge.

going to Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff. And one time, I think in 1971 or so, I went with General Haig, who was Kissinger's deputy at the time, to Vietnam. And I visited one of our hospitals, field hospitals. And the doctor sat me down and told me about the levels of drug addiction of our troops. Und dass einige Leute so viele Vialen von Heroin pro Tag benutzen.

Ich meine, es war eine Horror-Szene. Und das, glaube ich, war nicht der Fall am Anfang unserer Einwanderung. Aber irgendwie kamen Drogen in diese ganze Bildung. Und ich denke, das passiert auch den Russen in Afghanistan.

Es war ein großes Problem. Es war ein großes Problem. And you remember the army finally cleaned it up, but by cracking down very hard, but only after we got out of Vietnam.

Ich versuche, das zu verstehen. How do you explain that this happened to the Vietnam vets, but less so to the other ones who came back, like the ones who came back from Iraq?

I just think we're more aware. No, we have them, but we treat them more respectfully. I mean, I think the Vietnam vets felt they were not treated with respect.

So that's one of the lessons we learned.

Yeah, I think that's maybe true. Well, and we don't do drugs very well anyway, right? We don't deal with the addiction issues in our society very well.

No, I've not seen it, but I just made a note of it.

Because they left North Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements of 1954. There was a transfer of a million people to the South. And then many of those same people then, or their descendants, came to the United States. But I'll give John McCain and others great credit Despite having fought the war, despite having been... Actually, there were a couple of the prisoners of war.

McCain and the fellow also who was the first ambassador to Vietnam, to the unified Vietnam. They wanted to reopen relations. They didn't want to keep the grudge forever. And I think they're right. You know, when a war is over, it's over. You got to... You gotta try to rebuild a relationship of some kind. And I think we've done a pretty good job of that with today's Vietnam.

Even though we don't agree with all of their politics, right? I mean, I think it's... And I think John McCain and others who advocated for the relationship deserve our gratitude for having done that. Because, you know, we could have kept the grudge for even longer. And that would not have been good.

I think you're right. Most of my career, which ended up being 44 years, but in the early part of my career, when I always went up to Capitol Hill a lot from the State Department. In the beginning, you could count on these World War II veterans to carry forward our national security.

There you go.

Yep, yep. And that's a big loss. I think you're right about Iraq, although I don't know if there are enough of them.

I would add one thing. I saw it in Iraq. I saw it myself with my own eyes. The competence of our military, they have become so proficient in what they do. I mean, I think of them as a class of people amongst the best educated people in our country.

Gentlemen, when I was in Vietnam, we used to talk all night about the war. But are we going to talk? How much longer are we going to talk?

This is fun.

I would say they're very similar in the sense that we kind of just got tired of each of these conflicts and couldn't figure out a sustainable way to leave those two countries. And I think there was a sustainable way that would have not involved great cost for the United States, but might have prevented a lot of misery.

It's a little bit like the famous joke of Kissinger asking Zhou Enlai, the Prime Minister of China, what he thought of the French... Revolution, and Joe and I responded, it's too soon to tell. It's a great one.

Well, I enjoyed listening and talking to both of you.

Thank you very much. Really appreciate it. Thanks to both of you.

Yeah, first let me just say, just a small correction. Chuck, you said I'd been ambassador to Vietnam. I've been an ambassador five times, but not to Vietnam. I got there when I was 24 years old. When I got there in 1964, after studying Vietnamese in Washington for a number of months, we had about 20,000

trainers there no people who were designated as combat troops let me back you up a match you were doing a quick language school where were you working and what was the what did you think your mission was that you had to take well i was a career foreign service officer and i had okay started my career in 1960, the fall of 1960. I'd had an assignment to Hong Kong. I went back to Washington.

And they soon, because things were hotting up in Vietnam, asked me to take a 44-week, it wasn't so short, 44-week language training course. I went out there to the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon as a so-called provincial reporter. And I did a lot Things like what a journalist would do. I was assigned to cover six different provinces in South Vietnam.

There was 42 of them in all, six or seven. I would go out every week. I'd collect information on the economic, political, diplomatic, security, military, etc. situation in the field. Then I'd come back. Die nächste Woche schreibe ich meine Berichte, mache meine Arbeiten und all das. Wir hatten kein Internet und all das, du weißt das. Wir hatten auch keine guten Telefonnummern.

Also musste man eigentlich physisch zurück zur Ambasie kommen und Telegramme und so weiter schreiben. Das ist es, worauf ich gekommen bin. Die Nordvietnamiens hatten noch nicht angefangen, normale Nordvietnamiens-Armee-Truppen zu senden. into South Vietnam.

I got there in May of 64, the first time we detected North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam as part of their decision to escalate the situation in the South. Their tactics so far had not succeeded in causing South Vietnam to fall into their communist hands. So they decided to send their army and we captured a couple of their people. We are the South Vietnamese military, actually. im Juni 1964.